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I. INTRODUCTION: INTEGRITY AS HYDROLOGIC CONSTRUCT
Integrity. 1. The quality of having strong ethical principles. 2. The
state of being whole.
Oxford English Dictionary'
Integrity has become a prominent topic of public discourse, ironically
triggered by its conspicuous absence in a series of recent, highly-publicized
corporate scandals. In reflecting upon the collapse of the Enron Corpora-
tion, Forbes Magazine mused that it "was Socrates who first said that virtue
cannot be taught, yet paradoxically he spent the balance of his life trying to
do so anyway."2 The magazine posed the question whether business schools
can mold the ethics of their students as future executives. One professor,
articulating a seeming consensus among many, observed: "With Enron, you
can point to the players' bad character, or you can look at how the com-
pany's institutions, compensation methods and so forth disalign the values
of executives from those of the shareholders .... I see business ethics as a
plea for good institutional design."
3
The same considerations might be applied in the context of water allo-
cation law and policy. This Article will examine the extent to which there
may be a disalignment of values between water law and principles of hy-
drology, ecology, and the public good. Taken together, these principles sug-
gest a value system that I will call "hydrologic integrity." Invoking the dual
dimensions of integrity-both ethical and holistic-this Article will explore
the potential of the integrity concept to serve as a critical touchstone for the
advancement of sound water policy. The invocation of integrity is not in-
tended to be outcome-determinative, but rather to promote the coherence
and consistency of a wide range of legal outcomes.
What does it mean to incorporate integrity into water law? This is more
than an abstract or philosophical inquiry. Instead, the question invites con-
sideration of the essential relationship between water policy and core scien-
tific and social values. The development of a hydrologic construct premised
on integrity is essentially a problem of scale: the law must identify mean-
ingful geographical, ecological, temporal, and social units that will be pro-
tected as an integral whole. Integrity, therefore, is dependent upon a careful,
thoughtful determination of boundaries. This exercise in line-drawing is
daunting. If the boundaries encompass too small an area, water law becomes
little more than a parochial fight over a critical and life-sustaining resource.
1. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (rev. 10th ed. 2002). Integrity is related to "integer," a
thing complete in itself. Id.
2. Penelope Patsuris, Can Integrity Be Taught?, FORBES, Oct. 4, 2002, available at http://www.for
bes.com/2002110/04/lOO4virtue.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
3. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Loyola University Chicago Assistant Professor Alexei Marcoux).
[Vol. 56:4:10091010
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Conversely, if the boundaries encompass too large an area, water becomes
merely a fungible commodity incapable of sustaining fragile and unique
biological and human communities.
The federal Clean Water Act provides a useful starting point for this
analysis. The statutory statement of purpose incorporates a sweeping ac-
knowledgement of the relationship between water policy and integrity, set-
ting forth the objective "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters."4 The drafters' use of the word
"integrity" was conscious and deliberate. As the legislative history explains,
The word "integrity" as used is intended to convey a concept that
refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function of
ecosystems is maintained .... Although man is a "part of nature"
and a product of evolution, "natural" is generally defined as that
condition in existence before the activities of man invoked perturba-
tions which prevented the system from returning to its original state
of equilibrium.
5
Expanding upon the aspects of integrity protected under the Clean Wa-
ter Act, this Article will explore the relevance to water law of chemical,
physical, ecosystem, social, and ethical integrity. Just as the Clean Water
Act intended to prevent unacceptable "perturbations" of ecosystems, so also
this Article will consider the extent to which the law itself may work an
unacceptable perturbation of fundamental hydrologic and social principles.
In many instances, water policy compartmentalizes the law in ways that
have little to do with hydrologic reality and in ways that are antithetical to
wholeness and integrity. Examples include the legal bifurcation of surface
and groundwater, quantity and quality, land and water, and the present and
the future. Conversely, integrity-destroying policies may find legal support
in arguments that are deceptively integral and holistic in tone. For example,
Florida Everglades litigants opposed the regulation of phosphorous pollu-
tion under the guise of an argument styled the "unitary waters" theory.6
This Article views three contemporary water disputes through the lens
of hydrologic integrity. Case studies include the massive program to restore
the Florida Everglades;7 proposals for north-south water transfers in Florida,
evocative of the centuries-long dispute between northern and southern Cali-
4. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
5. H.R. REP. No. 92-911, at 76 (1972). For an analysis of the Clean Water Act's latent protection of
physical and biological integrity, see Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Tril-
ogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29 (2003). Professor
Adler also discusses the replacement of the view of ecosystem equilibrium, as asserted by the statute,
with the idea that ecosystems are dynamic. Id. at 45 n.86; see also Michael C. Blumm & William War-
nock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79 (2003) (discussing landmark cases in
which the EPA evaded the Clean Water Act's fundamental objective).
6. See infra Part II.D (examining the Miccosukee litigation).
7. See infra Part Il.A.
10112005]
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fornia; 8 and the struggle to apportion a three-state river system among com-
peting users as diverse as sprawling Atlanta and the sleepy oyster town of
Apalachicola, Florida.9 Surprisingly, perhaps, all three case studies focus
upon Florida, a state that enjoys an average annual rainfall of about 54
inches.'0 The fact that not even a water-rich eastern state is immune from
water controversies of national significance underscores the pressing need
to ensure that water law reflects principles of hydrologic reality, fairness,
and integrity.
II. CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY
Although Congress recognized the protection of chemical and physical
integrity as central purposes of the Clean Water Act," it defined neither of
those terms directly. To shed light on the notion of chemical integrity, one
might search for a definition of pollution. But here, the Act promotes ambi-
guity rather than clarity by providing two related-but potentially diver-
gent-definitions. The Act defines "pollution" broadly, as "the man-made
or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radio-
logical integrity of water."' 2 The definition of "pollutant" is narrower, de-
fined as materials "discharged into water,"' 3 including garbage, chemical
wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, and heat.1 4 The Act pro-
vides even less affirmative guidance with respect to the promotion of physi-
cal integrity. Rather, section 101(g) of the Act explicitly limits the federal
regulatory reach over state water allocation decisions, presumably including
state infrastructure affecting the physical integrity of water:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allo-
cate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be super-
seded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this Act. It is the further
policy of Congress that nothing in this Act shall be construed to su-
persede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been
established by any State.'5
This Article will use the phrase "chemical integrity" to refer to water qual-
ity, whether affected by alteration, addition, or discharge. The phrase
"physical integrity" will refer to the quantity, timing, and distribution of
water flows throughout an aquatic system.
8. See infra Part H1I.
9. See infra Part IV.
10, NATIONAL CLIMATIC DATA CENTER, UNITED STATES NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL PRECIPITATION, FLORIDA, available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/ncdc.ht
ml (providing the average annual rainfall for Florida from 1895-2004).
11. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2001 & Supp. 2004).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2001).
14. Id.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2001).
[Vol. 56:4:10091012
HeinOnline  -- 56 Ala. L. Rev.  1012 2004-2005
2005] On Integrity 1013
The degradation and ongoing restoration of the Florida Everglades will
be presented as a case study that implicates the notions of chemical and
physical integrity. In physical terms, the integrity of the Everglades has
been disrupted through human flood control projects of staggering propor-
tions: an average of 1.7 billion gallons of water is redirected each day di-
rectly into the Atlantic Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico, diverted from its his-
toric meandering path through the Everglades wetland complex.' 6 In chemi-
cal terms, phosphorus, mercury, and other pollutants from agricultural and
urban runoff have degraded the waters of the Everglades, 7 drastically re-
ducing the abundance of birds and wildlife. About 68 species are federally
listed as endangered or threatened, and the wading bird population has de-
creased by more than 90%.18
This opening case study is a hopeful one. Both state and federal gov-
ernments have passed legislation designed to restore the physical integrity
of the Everglades and to increase its water supply.' 9 Moreover, despite the
ambiguity of the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court has refused to me-
chanically limit the reach of federal control over Everglades pollution in the
name of protecting state regulation of water quantity.20
If the Everglades is a story involving chemical and physical integrity, it
also has a curious, little-known subtext that invokes notions of ethical integ-
rity. If asked to discuss the role of integrity in the modern world, many re-
spondents would cite to the scandal accompanying the collapse of the Enron
Corporation as the quintessential example of a systematic failure of integrity
in the realm of business.2' But fewer respondents would recognize a direct
link between Enron and notions of integrity in the realm of water law and
policy, much less cite to Enron's attempted involvement in Everglades res-
toration. Through its subsidiary, Azurix Corporation, Enron sought to get
into the business of buying and selling water as a market commodity.22 The
concept of water markets is ill-defined, inconsistently articulated, and
highly dependant upon the water laws of the relevant state.23 Perhaps na-
16. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP): Quality,
Quantity, Timing and Distribution, at http://www.evergladesplan.org/about/rest-plan-03.efm (last vis-
ited Dec. 7, 2004).
17. Id.
18. South Florida Water Management District, Everglades Information: FAQs, at http://glades.sfw
md.govlempactlhomeO2_everglades/O8-faq.shtm (last visited Dec. 7, 2004) [hereinafter SFWMD,
Everglades Information: FAQs]; see also South Florida Water Management District. Everglades Infor-
mation: Overview, at http://glades.sfwmd.govempact/home/02-everglades/index.shtml (last visited Dec.
7, 2004) [hereinafter SFWMD, Everglades Information: Overview].
19. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part I.D.
21. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
22. Michael Pollick & Chris Davis, Dead in the Water: Enron's Grab for Florida's Water Was
Factor in Collapse, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Mar. 17, 2002, available at http://www.whoseflorida.
com/azurix.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
23. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for
Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 317, 320 (2000) (disputing the existence of true water
markets).
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ively equating water markets with energy markets, 24 Enron briefly main-
tained an online website for water trading, "Water2Water.com.''25 Attempt-
ing to pun its way into the world of Florida water, Azurix conducted a
seminar entitled Liquid Assets, advocating a market-based approach to wa-
ter in Florida.2 6 The company reportedly offered financial assistance to Flor-
ida for the state's share of the Everglades Restoration Project in return for
the right to sell some of the water made available by the project.27 Azurix,
its online water trading website, and its otential involvement in Everglades
restoration all collapsed spectacularly. 2  In the aftermath, the failure was
cast not only as an unsuccessful business venture, but also as one tainted by
a lack of integrity.
29
24. Dale Kasler, Water Deals: A Trickle in a Thirsty State, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 25, 2002,
available at http:/lwww.sacbee.com/content/news/projects/liquid-assets/story/4128788p-515180c.htm]
(last visited Aug. 26, 2004) (reporting that a "former regional director of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
said entrepreneurs have been naive ... [in thinking they] could trade water like lumber ... [without]
fathom[ing] the complexities of a public resource ruled by layers of government and wrapped in emo-
tion").
25. Michael Grunwald, How Enron Sought to Tap the Everglades: Water Unit Lobbied Jeb Bush on
Privatization Bid, But Access Led Nowhere, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at A12, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.con/wp-dyn/articles/A42307-2002Feb7.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
[The author of this Article found the former Azurix water trading website while conducting research for
a previous article. Ignoring at her peril the rule that website sources should be downloaded and printed
immediately lest they disappear at some future date, the author subsequently sought in vain to verify the
accuracy of a footnote citation to Water2Water for scrupulous law review editors (instead substituting an
admittedly lackluster substitute citation).]
26. Pollick & Davis, supra note 22 (describing the seminar as Azurix's "coming-out party in Flor-
ida").
27. See Grunwald, supra note 25.
28. Id. (describing Water2Water.com as a "fiasco" and noting that "Azurix stock dropped 75 per-
cent in less than a year as the company went through $1 billion in capital .... When Enron's bonds were
downgraded to junk last fall, it was saddled with more than $900 million in Azurix debts, a key element
in its decision to file for bankruptcy protection."); Timothy Egan, Near Vast Bodies of Water, Land Lies
Parched, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, available at http://www.mindfully.orgfWater/Water-Land-Parched
.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2004) (describing the 2001 collapse of Azurix with losses exceeding $300
million).
29. See Kasler, supra note 24 (quoting a California water market advocate's criticism of the preva-
lent attitude that water marketing is "either wrong, immoral or illegal to make money off it-that's the
mindset"); Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program, Liquid Assets: Enron's Dip
into Water Business, Mar. 2002. at www.citizen.org/documents/LiquidAssets.pdf (last visited Aug. 24,
2004) (alleging that "[b]ecause in Florida, water could not be bought or sold, Azurix lobbied to change
the law," in part by using the services of a former manager of the local sponsor of the Everglades resto-
ration project) (the Public Citizen foundation was founded by Ralph Nader in 1971); Grunwald, supra
note 25 (writing that the Chairman of the Florida Legislature's Everglades Committee termed the pro-
posal "the most sinister business proposition the state has ever had"); Pollick & Davis, supra note 22
(citing with disapproval the statement of California consultant and Liquid Assets participant that "I don't
think water is so damn special"); Enron Chief Scorned Asset Division, LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb.
11, 2002, available at http://specials.ft.comenron/F'3ABOFQKXC.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2004)
(describing the head of Azurix as "sexy, tough and arrogant" and noting that "typically for Enron, Azu-
rix was financed creatively").
1014
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A. Case Study: The Florida Everglades
Nothing anywhere else is like [the Everglades]: their vast glittering
openness, wider than the enormous visible round of the horizon, the
racing free saltness and sweetness of their massive winds, under the
dazzling blue heights of space. . . The miracle of the light pours
over the green and brown expanse of saw grass and of water, shin-
ing and slow-moving below, the grass and water that is the meaning
and the central fact of the Everglades of Florida. It is a river of
grass.
Marjorie Stoneman Douglas (1947)30
The Florida Everglades is a vast collection of "swamps, marshes,
sloughs, prairies, tree islands and forests" that constitutes a resource of
"global significance." 31 Historically covering an area of about eight million
acres, this "river of grass" flowed southward from Lake Okeechobee to the
Atlantic Ocean in a slow continuous sheet of water32 that flowed only a
quarter mile each day.33 The area was a "paradise for wildlife. 34 Early visi-
tors reported skies dark with wading and migratory birds,35 as well as nu-
merous deer, Florida panthers, alligators, crocodiles, and other species.
36
The Everglades has been the persistent focus of human ingenuity, first
to reclaim (that is, drain) the wetland, and now to restore it. Like the Ever-
glades itself, these human interventions have been massive, slow-moving,
and vulnerable to disruption by the political process. Two features, in par-
ticular, have drawn human attention. First, the soils are fertile, moist, and
rich, having accumulated throughout thousands of years.37 Second, the area
is very flat, barely above sea level, and prone to flooding. 38 Taken together,
these two characteristics made the Everglades an inevitable magnet to agri-
culture and an irresistible challenge to human settlement, respectively. The
30. MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS, THE EVERGLADES: RIVER OF GRASS 5-6 (1947). First pub-
lished in 1947, River of Grass was an important piece of the author's more than one-half century of
advocacy for protection of the Everglades. The author died in 1998, at the age of 107. PEARSON EDUC.,
Infoplease, Biography: Marjory Stoneham Douglas, at http://infoplease.com/ipa/A0905518.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004).
31. Joel VanArman et al., South Florida Water Management District, in WATER RESOURCES ATLAS
OF FLORIDA 260,277 (Edward A. Fernald & Elizabeth D. Purdum eds., 1998).
32. Id. at 278; SFWMD, Everglades Information: Overview, supra note 18.
33. SFWMD, Everglades Information: Overview, supra note 18.
34. AUDUBON SOC'Y, Restoring the Everglades: The Past-River of Grass, at httpi/lwww.audubono
fflorida.org/main/glades/pgl .html [hereinafter AUDUBON SOC'Y, Restoring the Everglades] (last visited
Dec. 7, 2004).
35. SFWMD, Everglades Information: FAQ's, supra note 18.
36. AUDUBON SOc'Y, Restoring the Everglades, supra note 34.
37. See generally South Florida Water Management District, Everglades Information: Geology, at
http://glades.sfwmd.gov/empact/home/02_everglades/03-geology.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
38. See South Florida Water Management District, Everglades Information: History, at http://glades
.sfwmd.govlempactlhome/O2_everglades02_history.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
2005] 1015
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nation responded with dazzling engineering expertise to this pairing of op-
portunity and challenge through the Central and Southern Florida Project
(the "Project"), authorized by Congress in 1948 to reclaim the area for agri-
culture and settlement. 39 As the Supreme Court has noted, the Project "con-
sists of a vast array of levees, canals, pumps, and water impoundment areas
in the land between south Florida's coastal hills and the Everglades" de-
signed to promote flood protection, water conservation and drainage. 40 As
boasted by the Army Corps of Engineers, the United States "constructed the
most elaborate and effective water management system in the world ' 41 un-
der the auspices of the Project.
Unfortunately, as the Corps acknowledges, the Project has also had a
negative impact upon the Everglades and South Florida ecosystems.4 2 The
components of the Project are named in clinical, precise engineering terms
that emphasize the Project's technical competence, but belie the ecological
destruction that they have wrought. Taken together, structures with names
such as WCA-3 (water conservation area), L-33 and L-37 (levees), and S-9
(pump station) have destroyed the natural physical integrity of the Ever-
glades, instead artificially segmenting the great wetland into a sequence of
sometimes-dry engineered management units. 43 As a result of the construc-
tion of some 1,400 miles of canals, 181 primary control structures, and
2,000 secondary structures, the historic Everglades has been reduced in size
by about 40%, and once-flourishing bird populations have declined by about
93%.44
Slowly, the nation has reversed its course with respect to Everglades
policy. In 1988, the United States filed suit against two Florida agencies for
allegedly contaminating the Everglades National Park and the Loxahatchee
National Wildlife Refuge with phosphorus-contaminated farm runoff.45 In
response to the lawsuit, the Florida legislature passed the Everglades Protec-
39. Flood Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-858, § 203, 62 Stat. 1171, 1174 (authorizing Phase I
of the project).
40. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 99-100 (2004). The
Project was designed to correct for the ill-fated drainage canals of the early 1900s, which "proved to be a
source of trouble" by "lower[ing] the water table, allowing salt water to intrude upon coastal wells, and.
. prov[ing] incapable of controlling flooding." Id.
41. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Learning About the Everglades: A Brief History, at http://www.eve
rgladesplan.org/facts-info/learning.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Learning About the
Everglades] (linking to the website for the South Florida Corps district).
42. Id.
43. VanArman et al., supra note 31, at 279.
44. DIANE RAINES WARD, WATER WARS: DROUGHT, FLOOD, FOLLY, AND THE POLITICS OF THIRST
221-22 (2002); VanArman et al., supra note 31, at 279. Anecdotal observations by the author are consis-
tent with these statistics. During a five-day kayak trip through the aptly-named Ten Thousand Islands
region of the Everglades, this transplanted Northerner was surprised by the relative paucity of bird life in
the otherwise balmy paradise of South Florida. The disappointment was ameliorated in large part, how-
ever, by other delights (island camping, mosquito-dispelling breezes, inquisitive dolphins, and a magical
4 A.M. moonlight paddle).
45. See United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 1567, 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (de-
scribing the history of the litigation). The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (now, the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection) was also a named defendant. Id.
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tion Act, 46 and the parties entered into a settlement agreement approved by
the court in 1992.47 The state passed additional legislation, including the
Everglades Forever Act of 199448 and amendments thereto.49
In 1996, Congress outlined a comprehensive roadmap for Everglades
restoration.5 0 The resulting Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan
(CERP), developed with extensive public notice and comment,5' was ap-
proved by Congress in the Everglades Restoration Act of 2000.52 Overall,
the CERP contemplates the construction of 55 projects to restore the Ever-
glades ecosystem,53 at an estimated cost of eight billion dollars to be shared
by the federal government and the state of Florida.54 The South Florida Wa-
ter Management District, which operates the Project, is also the local spon-
sor of the restoration plan. Federal agencies estimate that it will take more
than thirty years to realize the restoration benefits contemplated by the
CERP.
56
B. The Historical Context: Separating Water Quality and Quantity
Petitioners. . . assert... that the Clean Water Act is only concerned
with water "quality," and does not allow the regulation of water
"quantity." This is an artificial distinction. In many cases . . . a suf-
46. Marjory Stoneman Douglas Everglades Protection Act, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 91-80
(West) (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. chp. 373.4592 (West 2000)).
47. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 847 F. Supp. at 1582.
48. Everglades Forever Act, 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-115 (West) (codified as amended at
FLA. STAT. ANN. chp. 373.4592 (West 2000)).
49. Act effective May 20, 2003, 2003 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2003-12 (West) (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. ANN. chp. 373.4592 (West 2000)). On or about May 20, Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed
into law amendments to the Everglades Forever Act. Id. Critics of the amendments included Judge
William M. Hoeveler, U.S. District Court, S.D. Florida-the judge who had approved the 1992 consent
decree and presided over the litigation since its inception in 1988. In a 2003 order, Judge Hoeveler
described the bill as "clearly defective" legislation that "opens the door to ten or more extra years [delay
in implementing the consent decree and Everglades cleanup] with no showing that such a lengthy exten-
sion is necessary." United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 88-CV-1886, 2003 WL 21145799, at
* 1 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Judge Hoeveler noted his dismay at the legislative process, writing that
[tihe bill was moved quickly through the legislative process, reportedly at the behest of more
than forty lobbyists for the sugar industry. There simply is no acceptable explanation for the
speed by which this was accomplished, given the fact that the deadlines remain three and a
half years off and given the state's assurances that much of the cleanup project is proceeding
on track.
Id. The sugar industry responded with a successful challenge to Judge Hoeveler's impartiality. After 15
years of service on the case, the judge was disqualified from further participation. United States v. S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Craig Pittman, Judge in Glades Case
Removed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 24, 2003, at IA.
50. Water Resources Development Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-303, 110 Stat. 3658.
51. See Programmatic Regulations for the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64,200, 64, 200 (Nov. 12, 2003) (final programmatic regulations).
52. Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, tit. VI, 114 Stat. 2572, 2680.
53. See § 601(b)(2)-(e), 114 Stat. at 2681-84.
54. See SFWMD, Everglades Information: Overview, supra note 18.
55. Programmatic Regulations for the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, 33 C.F.R. §
385.8 (2004).
56. Learning About the Everglades, supra note 41.
2005] On Integrity 1017
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ficient lowering of the water quantity in a body of water could de-
stroy all of its designated uses, be it for drinking water, recreation,
navigation or, as here, as a fishery.57
In perhaps the most counterintuitive triumph of law over hydrologic re-
ality, water quantity and water quality have been governed traditionally by
two distinct regimes of state and federal law, respectively. But the physical
reality of water does not fit neatly into this bifurcated scheme, and has pre-
sented numerous factual scenarios capable of confounding even the most
thoughtful jurist or legislator.
State common-law water allocation systems generally have neglected
the regulation of water pollution, largely as a matter of historic happen-
stance. As states devised systems for water allocation among competing
users, they gave little thought to pollution as a widespread phenomenon to
be addressed through a comprehensive regulatory approach. Indeed, some
early eastern decisions protected to some degree riparian landowners' right
to pollute, rather than the right of their neighbors to be free from pollution. 58
Others curtailed pollution on an ad hoc basis, either as a nuisance, or as
going beyond the reasonable use of water.59 But in any case, the riparian
doctrine failed to develop the institutional capacity to incorporate water
quality protection on a comprehensive, systematic, and prophylactic basis.
The western states were similarly not oriented toward integrating pollution
control into their systems of water rights, at least as a matter of common
law.6"
The federal government stepped into this regulatory void, primarily
through the federal Clean Water Act (CWA).6 1 Although federal regulators
have assumed a dominant role in pollution control, the CWA is an exercise
of cooperative federalism. 62 The states' roles are accommodated through a
dizzying array of compartmentalized statutory provisions that distinguish
63 . 64federal from state authority, water quality from water quantity, point
source from nonpoint source pollution, and the discharge of "pollutants"
from other "pollution" activities that may also degrade water quality.65
More specifically, the federal government is given the primary authority to
regulate water quality, acting through the "national pollutant discharge
elimination system" (NPDES), which addresses end-of-the-pipe (or "point
57. PUD No. I v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994).
58. See generally Joseph A. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under "'Pure" Riparian
Rights, in I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.01, § 7.03(e), at 7-84 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
59. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3.65 (Marie-Joy Paredes &
John J. Sullivan eds., 2004).
60. See generally Anne W. Squier, Water Quality, Water Quantity: The Reluctant Marriage, 21
ENvTL. L. 1081, 1081-86 (1991).
61. Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
62. See § 1253(a).
63. See, e.g., §§ 1361, 1370.
64. See § 1252.
65. See § 1362.
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source") pollution.66 In contrast, the states' primary authority to regulate
water quantity through state allocation law is preserved through a savings
clause that admonishes the federal government to refrain from interfering in
matters of state water allocation.67 In addition, the states are authorized to
regulate "nonpoint source" pollution-produced by diffused runoff-
through provisions in the statute that have been overlooked or underutilized
until relatively recently.68
Although the quality versus quantity schism is apparent in numerous
state laws, this section will take an anecdotal, fish-eye view of how it affects
the federal Clean Water Act. Facing the complex federalism of the CWA,
the courts have struggled mightily. As an intuitive matter, many courts be-
gin with the idea of integrity, citing the statutory purpose "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." 69 In some cases-such as NWF v. Gorsuch70 and NWF v. Consum-
ers Power Co.71-the courts become distracted by microscopic examina-
tions of statutory language, arriving at results that may be antithetical to
hydrologic integrity.72 In those cases, jurists may quibble over whether state
or federal law should apply, while pollution evades regulation altogether
and fish are asphyxiated, puried, desiccated, slimed, or otherwise brought to
their doom. 73 As one scholar noted wryly,
There are many reasons why law does not happen. The fish do not
understand these reasons. Only human satisfaction blinks on or
shuts down when these laws come alive or go inert. Laws that do
not deliver benefits directly to the fish do not deserve to be called
environmental laws. They should be called pretended law.74
But more recently, the courts have begun to implement the integrity
mandate with more vigor, advancing a broad view of the aquatic alterations
actionable under the CWA.71 In PUD No. 176 and Catskill Mountain Trout
66. § 1342.
67. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
68. See generally Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act Developments, 1999-2000, SE55 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 107 (2000). See also Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1033 (11 th Cir. 2002) (unsuccess-
fully attempting to compel the EPA to enforce nonpoint source pollution standards).
69. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2000) (defining
"pollution" as "the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radio-
logical integrity of water").
70. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see infra Part L.B. 1.
71. 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988); see infra Part 1lB.2.
72. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 587, 590 (addressing the EPA's construction of
statutory terms).
73. See, e.g., id. at 588-90 (discussing whether state or federal law should apply regarding pollution
control programs).
74. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Defeating Environmental Law: The Geology of Legal Advantage, 19
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 687, 705 (2002).
75. See, e.g., PUD No. I v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
76. See infra Part II.B.3.
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Unlimited v. City of New York, 7 the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit,
respectively, held that both reduced stream flow and interbasin transfers of
previously-contaminated water can constitute water pollution.78 In both
cases, the courts struggled with problems created by the statute's distinction
between water quality and water quantity, and between federal and state
authority.79
After Part II.B's discussion of the four CWA fish cases, the discussion
in Part I.C returns to the Florida Everglades, considering the Supreme
Court's 2004 decision in South Florida Water Management District v. Mic-
cosukee Tribe of Indians.80 In that case, the Supreme Court took up the
question addressed by the Second Circuit in Trout Unlimited,8 l considering
whether the decades-long struggle to reduce phosphorus levels in the Ever-
glades can be regulated under the CWA in cases where already-polluted
water is pumped from one area of the Everglades to another.82 This Article
will suggest that a conscious, consistent, and confident reliance upon the
hydrologic integrity mandate of the CWA would help the courts to reach
more coherent results as they navigate through the cooperative federalism
maze of the CWA.
1. Asphyxiated Fish: NWF v. Gorsuch
Beginning in the early 1970s, lawyers and judges began to face the
question of whether the Clean Water Act regulates the changes in water
quality caused by dams.83 There was little dispute that many dams caused
downstream water pollution by depleting dissolved oxygen content, super-
saturating waters, raising or lowering temperature by as much as thirty de-
grees Fahrenheit, increasing dissolved minerals and nutrients, and causing
sediment releases. 84 There was also little dispute that these changes could
result in dead fish.85 In an extreme example, the construction and early op-
eration of Missouri's Harry S. Truman Dam caused supersaturation of
downstream waters, killing by asphyxiation more than 400,000 fish in 1978,
and at least 100,000 fish in 1979.86 On the other hand, the cost of prevention
77. 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); see infra Part IL.B.4.
78. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 721; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 494.
79. See, e.g., PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 717-21.
80. 541 U.S. 95 (2004); see infra Part lI.D.
81. Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 491.
82. Miccosukee Tribe ofIndians, 541 U.S. at 102-03.
83. See Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 587; Rodgers, supra note 74, at 700 (discussing the 1973
EPA memorandum contending that dams are not "point sources" within the meaning of the Clean Water
Act).
84. NWF v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Gorsuch II), rev'g, NWF v. Gorsuch, 530 F.
Supp. 1291, 1297-98, 1300 (D.D.C. 1982) (Gorsuch 1).
85. Gorsuch II, 693 F.2d at 161-64.
86. As the district court explained, when a fish takes in supersaturated water, "[blubbles form in the
fish and may block the flow of blood in the blood vessels, in severe cases stopping the entire flow of
blood and causing death from lack of oxygen.... The condition is called gas bubble disease." Gorsuch
1, 530 F. Supp. at 1302.
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was the subject of some uncertainty, potentially involving the modification
of anywhere from 3,000 to 50,000 dams nationwide.
87
As the dispute reached the courts, it was ultimately framed in terms em-
phasizing legal compartmentalization, rather than aquatic integrity.88 In
NWF v. Gorsuch,89 the plaintiffs sought to compel the administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate dam-caused pollution
under the Clean Water Act.90 In response, the defendants highlighted the
Act's division of authority between the states and the federal government.
91
The EPA sought to limit its own regulatory jurisdiction, successfully argu-
ing for a "clear and precise distinction between point sources, which would
be subject to direct Federal regulation, and nonpoint sources, control of
which was specifically reserved to State and local governments," even
though the state nonpoint program was admittedly an "experiment. ' '92 The
nonfederal defendant-intervenors argued for an additional bifurcation-the
separation of water quality and water quantity-interpreting federal control
over quality narrowly in order to preserve broad state control over the quan-
tity.93 The intervenors cited to section 101(g) of the Act: "It is the policy of
Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water
within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated, or otherwise im-
paired by this [Act]."94 The court agreed, concluding that "Congress did not
want to interfere any more than necessary with state water management, of
which dams are an important component." 95
The case is traditionally cited for its pronounced, pre-Chevron defer-
ence to the EPA's limited interpretation of the scope of its own authority.
96
But the bifurcation aspect of the case is equally compelling, produced by the
court's embrace of the distinction between water quantity and water quality,
coupled with the Clean Water Act's separation between point and nonpoint
sources of pollution.97 There are two noteworthy aspects of the court's
commitment to a compartmentalized view of water pollution and water al-
location. First, the court struggled with the CWA's distinction between fed-
erally regulated pollutants (limited to substances added to water) and state
regulated pollution (including water conditions, such as low dissolved oxy-
98gen, cold, and supersaturation). Similarly, the court accepted the EPA's
87. Gorsuch 11, 693 F.2d at 182.
88. See, e.g., Gorsuch 1 530 F. Supp. at 1295.
89. Id. at 1291.
90. Id. at 1295.
91. Gorsuch I1, 693 F.2d at 165.
92. Id. at 176 (quoting from the legislative history of the 1977 statutory amendments).
93. Id. at 178-79.
94. Id. at 178 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000)). The Act also states: "It is the further policy of
Congress that nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of
water which have been established by any State." § 1251 (g).
95. Gorsuch 11, 693 F.2d at at 178.
96. Id. at 174 (concluding that "we must accept [the EPA's] interpretation [that low dissolved oxy-
gen, cold, and supersaturation are not pollutants] unless it is manifestly unreasonable").
97. Id. at 156.
98. Id. at 171-74. The district court had rejected this distinction, as advanced by the defendants, for
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narrow view of the statutory trigger for federal regulation, the addition of a
pollutant.99 In the court's view, even though a dam may cause pollution, it
does not add pollutants sufficient to create federal jurisdiction unless it
"physically introduces a pollutant into water from the outside world." 1° °
Thus, the federal EPA was not obligated to prevent fish kills resulting from
adverse modifications of stream conditions because dams do not physically
and directly add heat, cold, minerals, or sediment to the water that passes
through them. Rather, in the EPA's view as accepted by the court, those
changed conditions occur upstream as water accumulates in reservoirs, and
the modified water simply passes unchanged through the dam.'0 ' With re-
spect to the creation of supersaturated conditions, the EPA successfully ar-
gued that the transformation "occurs downstream, after the water is released
from the dam." 10 2 In both cases, the dam itself does not cause the addition
of pollutants to the water.103
Ironically, the court framed its separation of federal quality and state
quantity authority as an effort to promote, rather than to destroy, integrity. 104
The court acknowledged multiple times the federal goals to "restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters" and to achieve a zero-discharge status, 10 5 but relegated this language
to the realm of purely hortatory goals, rather than binding policy. 10 6 In a
novel approach to the statutory promise of integrity, the court adopted a
retrogressive view of history: rather than rely upon an increasing federal
pollution control presence in the face of the states' failure to address the
problem, 10 7 the court revived the vision of state control over both water
quality and water quantity:
In light of its intent to minimize federal control over state decisions
on water quantity, Congress might also, if confronted with the issue,
have decided to leave control of dams insofar as they affect water
quality to the states. Such a policy would reduce federal/state fric-
its perceived failure to recognize that, "the [CWA] must be given a reasonable interpretation, not parsed
and dissected with the meticulous technicality applied in testing a common law indictment or a deed
creating an estate in fee tail." Gorsuch 1, 530 F. Supp. at 1304 (quoting NRDC v. Costle, Inc., 564 F.2d
573, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
99. Gorsuch H1, 693 F.2d at 174-75.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 175.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 177.
105. Id. at 166, 177, 179.
106. Id. at 180-81 (asserting that "[w]hat started out as a national 'policy' in the Senate bill was
watered down to a 'goal' in the House") (citations omitted). The court concluded: "In short, while Con-
gress wanted to eliminate pollution if practicable, it realized that it might have to settle for something
less." fd.
107. The court acknowledged that Congress had "recognize[ed] the weaknesses of past state water
pollution efforts" but noted that Congress "explicitly chose not to completely federalize water pollution
control, but instead directed the states to establish their own pollution control programs under EPA
oversight." Id. at 178.
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tion and would permit states to develop integrated water manage-
ment plans that address both quality and quantity.1
0 8
The court then retreated from this promise of integrity by qualifying its con-
fidence in the states' ability to control pollution:
Finally, we cannot say, on the record before us, that federal inter-
vention is needed because the states have abdicated their ...re-
sponsibility over a truly pressing national problem. The record does
not show how vigorous state enforcement has been, but at least
some efforts have been made to remedy dam-caused pollution.'09
The court concluded weakly that "someone" most likely would have
brought dam-caused pollution to Congress' attention during the drafting and
amendment of the Clean Water Act if it "was truly of major proportions.""10
2. Purged Fish: NWF v. Consumers Power Company
Six years after the District of Columbia Circuit rendered its opinion in
Gorsuch II, the Sixth Circuit took up the issue of water quality changes
brought about by a hydroelectric power dam in Ludington, Michigan."' In
NWF v. Consumers Power Co., the environmental plaintiff sought to bring
the dam within the scope of federal authority under the Clean Water Act." 12
The Sixth Circuit described the Ludington facility as "one of the largest
pumped storage facilities in the world, which can move in one day more
than 20 billion gallons of water between its manmade reservoir and Lake
Michigan."' '3 In the process, the court delicately noted that a substantial
number of fish were "entrained" and destroyed as they passed through the
facility's pumps and turbines. 14 In a subsequent reference to Consumers
Power, the Second Circuit used blunter terms to describe the hydrologic and
ecological reality of the process:
[T]he defendant had withdrawn water from Lake Michigan, along
with some surprised fish, for hydroelectric power generation. The
water and fish were then returned to the Lake after passing through
hydroelectric generators, which purded some of the fish. The court
108. Id. at 178-79.
109. Id. at 183.
110. Id. ("Moreover, if dam-caused pollution was truly of major proportions, someone, be it EPA, the
Wildlife Federation, or other environmental groups, would most likely have brought it to Congress'
attention, either in 1972 or in 1977.").
111. NWF v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
112. d.
113. Id. at 581.
114. Id. (euphemistically describing "live and dead fish, and fish remains" as "entrained fish").
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found that returning the fish to the Lake, albeit in a different form,
was not an "addition" because the fish had already been there. 
115
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the "[m]illions of pounds of live
fish, dead fish and fish remains annually discharged into Lake Michigan by
the Ludington facility are pollutants within the meaning of the [Clean Water
Act], since they are 'biological materials.""' 6 However, relying upon the
District of Columbia's decision in Gorsuch II, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that no permit was required under the Clean Water Act because the Luding-
ton facility did not add pollutants to Lake Michigan from the outside
world. 117 The court reasoned that, although "manipulation of water by the..
. turbine changes the form of the pollutant from live fish to a mixture of live
and dead fish," there "can be no doubt that the Ludington facility does not
create the fish which become entrained in the process of generating electric-
ity. ,
,1s
The court's careful focus upon the statutory text threatened to obscure
the pragmatic consequences advanced by its decision. The court recited the
Clean Water Act's objective to "restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,"" 9 but favored a non-
integrated approach under which this type of pollution would be con-
trolled-if at all-by agencies other than the EPA and under statutes other
than the CWA.1 20 Despite the court's optimism that such other authorities
would fill the regulatory void,' 2' it would be at least a decade before such
options would begin to become viable.122 In the interim, the Ludington fa-
cility, and others like it, could continue to produce water conditions the
court described as "inimical to life"' 23 by "transform[ing] ... biomass from
115. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 491-92
(2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
116. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 583 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000) (defining "pollut-
ant" as including "biological materials")).
117. Id. at 583-84 (citing Gorsuch H1, 693 F.2d at 165, for the proposition that the permitting re-
quirements of the Clean Water Act do not apply unless five elements are satisfied, including the addition
of pollutants to regulated waters).
118. Id. at 585.
119. Id. at 582 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000)).
120. The court suggested that the dam's destruction of fish might be controlled either under state
nonpoint source control through water quality standards, or by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion's authority to issue dam operating licenses under the Federal Power Act. Id. at 588, 590.
121. The court asserted:
Thus, the absence of EPA regulations does not mean that there will he no regulatory over-
sight of the effect of the Ludington facility on fish resources. Indeed, one of the major pur-
poses of the passage of the Federal Power Act ... was to provide a regulatory regime sensi-
tive to problems affecting fishery resources .... EPA regulation would not add anything su-
perior to existing FERC regulation in terms of knowledgeability or dedication to the fish.
Id. at 590.
122. Section 10(j)(1) of the Federal Power Act was added as part of the Electric Consumers Protec-
tion Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. § 8030)(1) (2000), and provides that every FERC license must include
conditions to "protect, mitigate damage[] to, and enhance, fish and wildlife."
123. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 587.
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a living, useful form into a lifeless entity with no apparent value."' 124 The
court concluded that the problem could not be addressed by the EPA under
the Clean Water Act absent congressional amendment of the legislation.
25
The court's approach might very well have been the inevitable product of
the bifurcated quality and quantity, federal and state, point source and non-
point source distinctions suggested by the Clean Water Act.
Nevertheless, the unsatisfying aspect of the Consumers Power opinion
has been aptly captured by one commentator, who bemoaned generally the
narrow interpretation of the EPA's Clean Water Act authority:
Found there are the generic fishway criteria that might have been
applied and enforced against.., dams. These criteria include rules
on elevation between ... pools . . . [and] fishway channel veloci-
ties .... Fish will die in these conditions. But we know with legal
certitude that they will not die from the "addition" of "pollutants"
from a "point source."16
The court's approach illustrates the perils of an overly-legalistic focus upon
the narrow requirement of "addition" to the exclusion of the broader goal of
"integrity." Surely any scientist would describe the transformation of Lake
Michigan from habitat for millions of live fish to cemetery for millions of
decomposing fish as an assault upon the lake's integrity. Only a myopic
lawyer or jurist could view them as the same, a view that could be broad-
ened by a focus upon the resultant water quality and integrity.
3. Fish Out of Water: PUD No. 1
In Gorsuch H and Consumers Power, dam operators and federal regula-
tors prevailed in their argument that the EPA lacks statutory authority to
regulate aspects of water quality that might impinge upon state authority to
allocate water quantity. In a case that reached the United States Supreme
Court in 1994, the converse factual situation was at issue: the state of Wash-
ington sought to prescribe a minimum quantity of water that a proposed
hydroelectric facility dam must bypass over the objection of the project pro-
ponents that the Clean Water Act authorized the states to regulate only the
quality of certain discharges.
PUD No. 1 v. Washington Department of Ecology127 concerned the pro-
posed Elkhorn Hydroelectric Project on the Dosewallips River in Washing-
ton. 128 The Project would divert most of the river's flow out of its bed to
pass through streamside electricity-generating turbines. 29 Only a "residual
124. Id. (quoting NWF v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989, 1006-07 (W.D. Mich. 1987)).
125. Id. at 587 (quoting Gorsuch 11, 693 F.2d at 183).
126. Rodgers, supra note 74, at 701-02.
127. 511 U.S. 700(1994).
128. Id. at 708.
129. Id.'at 708-09.
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minimum flow of between 65 and 155 [cubic feet per second]" would re-
main in the 1.2-mile reach dewatered by the project. 130 To protect the
Dosewallips fishery, the Washington State Department of Ecology sought to
impose a requirement that at least 100-200 cubic feet per second remain in
the river bed throughout the bypass reach during various months of the
year.'3' The state agency acted pursuant section 303 of the Clean Water Act,
which requires states to adopt federally-approved water quality standards
for their intrastate waters based upon the designated uses of the waters.1
The particular river segment at issue-located in close proximity to both the
Olympic National Park and the Olympic National Forest-had been desig-
nated as "Class AA (extraordinary)," with its designated uses including the
migration, rearing, spawning, and harvesting of salmon and other fish.
133
The project proponents challenged the state standards, claiming, inter alia,
that the CWA provisions exclude "water quantity issues from direct regula-
tion under the federally controlled water quality standards authorized in §303."" 34
Justice O'Connor dismissed this notion as "peculiar."'' 35 Writing for a 7-
2 majority,136 she began her opinion with the familiar refrain that the Clean
Water Act was intended to promote the "chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters."' 37 Unlike the authors of Gorsuch II and
Consumers Power, Justice O'Connor invoked the statutory purpose as more
than mere aspirational incantation. Instead, she recited the statute's lan-
guage of scientific integrity as the springboard for a decision that also pro-
moted the legal integrity of the Clean Water Act's program to protect fish
and aquatic life. She suggested that fish could die just as easily from lack of
water as from pollution, describing the distinction between water quality
and quantity as "artificial."' 38 She concluded with a statement recognizing
that the integrity of water encompasses aspects of both quality and quantity,
asserting that "there is recognition in the Clean Water Act itself that reduced
stream flow, i.e., diminishment of water quantity, can constitute water pol-
lution."' 39
The petitioners' sought to counter the state's recital of the integrity
mantra with an ideal of their own-that of federalism. Agreeing with the
130. Id. at 709.
131. State, Dep't of Ecology v. PUD No. 1,849 P.2d 646, 650 (Wash. 1993) (describing state meas-
ures to "prohibit the degradation of fish habitat and spawning in the Dosewallips"), affd sub nom, PUD
No. I v. Washington, 500 U.S. 700 (1994).
132. PUD No. 1, 500 U.S. at 704 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000)).
133. id. at 706, 708.
134. Id. at 720.
135. Id.; see also State, Dep't of Ecology, 849 P.2d at 651 (quoting the project operator's argument
that "water quality standards [under the CWA] are limited to pollution and discharges, as opposed to
stream flow levels").
136. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a dissenting opinion. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at
724.
137. Id. at 704 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(c) (2000)).
138. Id. at 719.
139. Id.
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petitioners, the dissent argued that the majority's opinion would "signifi-
cantly disrupt the carefully crafted federal-state balance" created by Con-
gress. 40 Furthermore, the dissent argued for its own type of integrity-
linguistic integrity. Asserting that statutory interpretation is a "holistic en-
deavor,"1 41 the dissent chastised the majority for unduly extending the
states' role under the CWA. 4 2 Citing to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary, the dissent argued for a distinction between "discharge" and
"intake":
The term "discharge" is not defined in the CWA, but its plain and
ordinary meaning suggests "a flowing or issuing out," or "some-
thing that is emitted.". . . A minimum stream flow requirement, by
contrast, is a limitation on the amount of water the project can take
in or divert from the river .... That is, a minimum stream flow re-
quirement is a limitation on intake-the opposite of discharge. Im-
position of such a requirement would thus appear to be beyond a
State's authority as it is defined by § 401(a)(1).143
The majority did not reach its conclusion easily, but engaged in the
same sort of linguistic gymnastics followed by the Gorsuch II and Consum-
ers Power courts. In Gorsuch II, the D.C. Circuit declined to extend federal
jurisdiction to the prevention of fish-killing alterations of water conditions,
instead advancing a technical distinction between pollution and pollut-
ants.' 44 Likewise, in Consumers Power, the Sixth Circuit declined to extend
federal jurisdiction to the prevention of fish mutilation and entrainment,
instead advancing a technical distinction between the addition of dead fish
from an outside source and the separation of existing fish into an array of
body parts. 45 The PUD No. I Court reached the opposite conclusion-
extending state jurisdiction to the maintenance of water levels necessary to
sustain fisheries-but did so by means of a similarly tortured linguistic in-
terpretation. The Court refused to limit the states' authority under the CWA
to regulate only discharges resulting from federally-permitted dams, but
recognized also state authority to regulate the applicants themselves who
sought such federal permits. 46 This awkward struggle with linguistic inter-
140. Id. at 724 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming that state imposition of minimum stream flows
impinged upon federal dam-licensing authority established under the Federal Power Ac).
141. Id. at 726 (quoting United Savings Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484
U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 725.
144. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
146. PUD No. I v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 711 (1994). As the Court noted,
section 401 of the CWA "requires States to provide a water quality certification before a federal [dam]
license or permit can be issued for activities that may result in any discharge into intrastate navigable
waters." Id. at 707 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000)). The states' authority is further described in two
subsections of section 401. Under section 401(a), states must certify "that any such discharge [from a
federally licensed dam] will comply with the applicable provisions" of the CWA. Id. at 707 (emphasis
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pretation-by courts both extending and limiting the scope of authority un-
der the CWA-is perhaps a testament to the ambiguity of congressional
intent and the need to give increased weight to the integrity mandate of the
CWA.
4. Muddy Fish: Catskill Mountains
Almost two decades after Gorsuch 11 and Consumers Power held that
dam discharges do not require Clean Water Act permits for waters merely
passing through dam structures, 147 the Second Circuit took up the issue in
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York. 1 48
Bolstered by a victory at the district court level, the state defendants-New
York City and the State of New York-appeared to have a solid legal and
equitable case that the City's practice since before World War II of transfer-
ring pristine, upstate, Catskill Mountain drinking water to ten million down-
stream city residents did not require a federal discharge permit. But in a
decision with potentially widespread ramifications for dam operators
throughout the nation, the Second Circuit rejected the so-called "singular
entity" theory of navigable waters, under which "an addition to one water
body is deemed an addition to all of the waters of the United States."
1 49
Rather, the Second Circuit held that interbasin water transfers could cause
an "addition" of pollutants within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, pro-
vided that the dam introduced pollutants from "any place outside the par-
ticular water body to which pollutants are introduced." 150 At issue was the
city's vintage and extensive water supply network that supplies approxi-
mately 40% of the drinking water consumed by New York City.
151
The dispute centered upon the 18-mile Shandaken Tunnel, which di-
verted up to 650 million gallons of water daily from the Schoharie Reser-
voir to Esopus Creek, for ultimate delivery to the City for consumption.
52
Along with water, the tunnel introduced silts and fine red clays into the
premier trout fishery of Esopus Creek.153 As a result of the city's water-
works, Esopus Creek suffered from a visible increase of turbidity and sus-
added). Furthermore, section 401 (d) requires that such state certifications will set forth any "other limita-
tions" that are necessary to "assure that any applicant" will comply with applicable provisions of the
CWA. Id. at 707-08 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that states therefore have the authority to
protect the water quality impacts resulting from both the discharge itself, and more broadly, from other
activities of the applicant not necessarily related to the discharge: "The text refers to the compliance of
the applicant, not the discharge." Id. at 711.
147. See supra Parts 11.B.1 and ILB.2.
148. 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001).
149. Id. at 493 (criticizing Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1296-97 (1st Cir.
1996)).
150. Id. at 489-91.
151. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 244 F. Supp. 2d 41,
46 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (Catskill Mountains (remand)).
152. Id. at 46-47.
153. Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 485.
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pended solids, and a significant decrease in its value for flyfishing.'5 4 As the
plaintiffs complained,
The water coming from the Tunnel carries extremely high levels of
fine clay particles, which turn the clear waters of Esopus Creek to a
muddy brown below the Tunnel. Local fishermen call this stretch of
the Esopus 'Yoohoo Creek' after the chocolate-flavored soft drink.
Schoharie water is so polluted with silt that Esopus Creek below the
Shandaken Tunnel is largely unfishable.'55
The plaintiffs demonstrated no significant injury to the trout themselves
from the muddy conditions, other than some evidence of a decrease in fish
size below the tunnel.
156
Like the defendants in Gorsuch157 and Consumers Power,158 the New
York defendants argued that federal regulation was inappropriate in the
absence of the addition of pollutants from point sources. 5 Furthermore,
they claimed that principles of federalism counseled against federal regula-
tion of state water management, particularly of such an important system
that supplied water to approximately 50% of the state's population. 6° In
support of their position, the defendants cited the Clean Water Act's state-
ment that "[i]t is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded,
abrogated, or otherwise impaired by this [Act]."16I
The Catskills litigation implicates the notion of integrity in subtle, and
at times counterintuitive, ways. At its heart, the resolution of the dispute
requires a thoughtful determination of ecosystems and scale-the appropri-
ate size of hydrologic units that should be granted independent legal signifi-
cance for the purpose of regulatory schemes such as the Clean Water Act.
Upon first consideration, the defendants' "singular entity" theory is entic-
ingly holistic, conceptually linking all of the subwatersheds of the Catskills
region into a unified whole. For example, New York City argued that it
154. Id.
155. Riverkceper, Catskills Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited et al. v. City of New York, at www.
riverkeeper.org/campaign.php/watershed/we-are.-doing/154 (last visited June 27, 2005); see also Brief
of Defendants-Appellees at 14, Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-9447) (noting
the paucity of evidence that the defendants "physically introduced" pollution "into water from the out-
side world").
156. Catskill Mountains (remand), 244 F. Supp. 2d at 50.
157. NWF v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
158. NWF v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir. 1988).
159. The defendants argued that
the City does not 'do' anything to the water it diverts to the Esopus Creek. It simply redirects
water from certain Catskills streams into the Esopus Creek, which is in a different Catskills
subwatershed. The City does not add anything to the water or alter it in any way.
Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 14, Catskill Mountains (No. 00-9447).
160. Id. at 12 (citing to Gorsuch 11, 693 F.2d at 156, for the proposition that there is "specific indica-
tion in the [Clean Water] Act that Congress did not want to interfere any more than necessary with state
water management, of which dams are an important component").
161. See Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 494 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(g) (2000)).
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"simply redirects water from certain Catskills streams into the Esopus
Creek, which is in a different Catskills subwatershed. The City does not add
anything to the water or alter it in any way."'' 62 The implication of this ar-
gument is that numerous subwatersheds should be regarded together as a
single entity of sweeping scope, potentially encompassing all of the nation's
navigable waters. 163 As a corollary of this broad and integral view, the
movement of water and natural sediments throughout a unified watershed is
distinct from the type of industrial pollution that Congress intended to regu-
late under the Clean Water Act. 164
The Second Circuit, however, invoked an inapposite notion of integrity
that would give separate legal status to such subwatersheds.165 The court
began by noting its agreement with the basic premise of the Gorsuch and
Consumers Power courts. The Second Circuit agreed that no permit would
be required to transfer water where both source and destination were identi-
cal, 166 reasoning that "[i]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above
the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has not 'added' soup or anything
else to the pot .... In requiring a permit for such a 'discharge,' the EPA
might as easily require a permit for Niagara Falls."' 167 At that point, how-
ever, the Second Circuit noted its departure from the assumptions of the
District of Columbia and Sixth Circuits:
The present case . . . strains past the breaking point the assumption
of "sameness" made by the Gorsuch and Consumers Power courts.
Here, water is artificially diverted from its natural course and trav-
els several miles from the Reservoir through Shandaken Tunnel to
Esopus Creek, a body of water utterly unrelated in any relevant
sense to the Schoharie Reservoir and its watershed. No one can rea-
sonably argue that the water in the Reservoir and the Esopus are in
any sense the "same," such that "addition" of one to the other is a
logical impossibility.
68
Reciting the familiar statutory purpose of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,"'169 the
Second Circuit concluded that "[a]rtificially transferring water and pollut-
ants between watersheds as the City has done here might well interfere with
that integrity."' 17 As a result of the court's opinion, the City applied for a
162. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 14, Catskill Mountains (No. 00-9447).
163. This idea is developed further in Part l.D.
164. See Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
165. Id. at 494.
166. Id. at 492 n.3.
167. Id. at 492.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 494 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
170. Id.
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federal discharge permit, thus subjecting itself to a variety of terms and
conditions designed to protect Esopus Creek as a pristine waterway. 171
The practical ramifications of the permit process-including the extent
to which both Esopus Creek and New York's water supply can be pro-
tected-will no doubt help to shape the evolving notion of integrity as a
guide to water policy. The U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in
2004, as discussed in Part II.D below.
C. The Opportunity: Replumbing the Everglades
The Everglades restoration plan promises to restore the physical and
chemical integrity of the ecosystem. At its heart is the challenge of physical
restoration. As the project sponsors explain, "Getting the water right is the
critical part of restoring the south Florida ecosystem. '  Furthermore, the
"principal goal of restoration is to deliver the right amount of water, of the
right quality, to the right places, and at the right time."' 73 The plan ambi-
tiously expects to "return most of pre-drainage flow," at least to the Na-
tional Park portion of the Everglades. 74 Indeed, the project is so ambitious
that former Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt wrote that "[riestoration of a
natural system of this scale and sensitivity has never before been attempted
and it is the most ambitious environmental restoration project in the history
of civilization." 1
75
The effort has been referred to as the "replumbing" of the Everglades.1
76
Ironically, perhaps, the ills caused by existing flood-control irrigation works
will be cured by yet more engineering. 77 Although the project will remove
over 240 miles of levees and canals, it will also construct new reservoirs
covering more than 217,000 acres and 300 aquifer storage and recovery
171. The State of New York had designated the relevant portion of the creek as a "class A(T) stream"
and set a water quality turbidity standard of "no increase that will cause a substantial visible contrast to
natural conditions." Catskill Mountains (remand), 244 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REG. tit. 6 § 703(2) (2002)).
172. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), Corner-
stone for Entire South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Effort, at http://www.evergladesplan.org/about/res
t-plan_0l.cfm (described as "the official website of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan")
(last visited Dec. 7, 2004).
173. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), Quality,
Quantity, Timing and Distribution, at http:l/www.evergladesplan.orglabout/rest-plan_03.cfm (last vis-
ited Mar. 2, 2005) [hereinafter CERP, Quality, Quantity].
174. SFWMD, Everglades Information: Overview, supra note 18.
175. South Florida Water Management District, The Living Everglades, Everglades Information:
Water Resources, at http:l/glades.sfwd.gov/empactlhomel02-evergladesl05_water_resourcesfindex.shtm
I (last visited Mar. 18, 2005) (quoting BRUCE BABBITT, THE THtN GREEN LINE (1996)).
176. See. e.g., Bill Moyers Reports, Earth on Edge, available at http://www.pbs.org/eathonedge/ecos
ystems/coastal2.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
177. In the context of a different ecosystem, the Columbia River Basin, one commentator has noted
the irony of relying upon technological fixes to resolve technology-induced problems. See Michael C.
Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution of Ecosystem Management in the Columbia River
Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653, 654 (1997) ("Strangely, reliance on large-scale technological fixes to cure
the Columbia Basin's ills has continued .... The river's ecosystem is now so hostile to young salmon
that they are barged and trucked downriver to escape... dams.").
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wells.178 Overall, the plan includes more than sixty technical elements that
will take more than three decades and $7.8 billion to complete. 179
D. The Opportunity: The Miccosukee Litigation
The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken twice within a decade on the topic
of aquatic integrity, within the context of the Clean Water Act.180 In two
opinions written by Justice O'Connor, the Court considered the jurisdic-
tional reach of the federal statute to protect the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the nation's waters. As considered in Part II.B.3 above,
the 1994 decision PUD No. 1 suggested that diminishment of water quantity
can constitute water pollution and rejected, as artificial, a rigid distinction
between water quality and quantity.18 In 2004, the Court considered
whether the mere conveyance of polluted water from one relatively dirty
location in the Everglades to another relatively pristine location-without
adding more contaminants-constituted the addition of pollutants from a
point source within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. In South Florida
Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, the Court held
that "a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need
only convey the pollutant to 'navigable waters. ' ' ' 82 Accordingly, such an
affront to the ecological integrity of the Everglades might fall within the
statutory permitting authority, provided that the lower court determined on
remand that the source water body and receiving water body are "meaning-
fully distinct."' 
83
In particular, Miccosukee Tribe focused upon three components of the
Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project. 84 The C-Il canal col-
lects phosphorous-laden water from agricultural, urban, and residential land
and drains it westward to the S-9 pump station, where it is pumped against
gravity and deposited into a remnant of the original Everglades called
WCA-3.' 85 The process serves at least two functions: the supplying of water
to wetlands habitat and the draining of flood water to preserve human set-
tlement. 86 As noted by the Court, without such drainage, "the populated
western portion of Broward County would flood within days."'18 7 The Mic-
178. CERP, Quality, Quantity, supra note 173.
179. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), What Is
the Plan?, at http:/Iwww.evergladesplan.org/about/rest__plan.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
180. See PUD No. I v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994); S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
181. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
182. 541 U.S. at 105.
183. Id. at 101-02, 112.
184. Id. at 99-101.
185. Id. at 100-01. At oral argument, counsel for the tribe asserted that "C- I I is a canal that has gas
stations, urban shopping malls, [and] industrial parks around it." Transcript of Oral Argument at 39,
Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626).
186. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 100-01.
187. Id. at 111. Broward County is located in southeastern Florida, just north of the Miami metropoli-
tan region.
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cosukee tribe and an environmental organization brought suit against the
South Florida Water Management District, alleging that the District had
been illegally discharging pollutants through S-9 into the Everglades with-
out the requisite permit.' 8 The tribe-which had resided in the Everglades
for generations and which enjoyed a perpetual lease to most of WCA-3-
alleged that phosphorous and other nutrients discharged by the S-9 pump
were causing long term degradation to the water quality and biological
health of the wetland ecosystem. t 9 As noted by the district court, "The way
of life of the Tribe and its members, including their religious, cultural, eco-
nomic, and historical identity, relies upon.., preservation of the Everglades
in its natural state."'190 Although the tribe acknowledged that the Everglades
restoration plan contained provisions to address just such pollution, it
sought to ensure that the District would comply with the plan within a rea-
sonable period of time.'9
The argument of both sides to the dispute implicated the idea of integ-
rity, albeit in widely divergent ways. The parties agreed that the S-9 pump
was the but-for cause of the contaminated wetland, and that the canal and
wetland were physically and artificially separated by Project levees. 9 The
real point of disagreement was that of scope-the determination of the
proper scale of the water body whose wholeness and integrity should be
preserved independent of adjacent areas. 193 The tribe considered the historic
Everglades as separate pieces, seeking to protect the remaining, relatively
healthy WCA-3 area as an integral unit, distinct from the polluted canal. 1
94
In support of this view, the tribe argued that current differences in water
chemistry between the wetland and the canal qualified them for separate
legal treatment as two distinct water bodies.195 The tribe argued for ecologi-
cal integrity, noting that the C-I 1 canal is an artificial canal surrounded by
gas stations, shopping malls, and other trappings of urban society:
188. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 1999 WL 33494862 (S.D. Fl. 1999).
The tribe was joined as plaintiffs by The Friends of the Everglades.
189. Id. at *1.
190. Id.
191. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 185, at 46. The attorney for the plaintiffs stated:
"We ... believe,... as Congress did, that the Clean Water Act-that the programs in place were not
always implemented and that the Clean Water Act was necessary as a backstop to stop the backsliding."
Id. For a cynical view of the restoration process, see W. Hodding Carter, Editorial, A Wetland Dying of
Thirst, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004 (claiming that "[d]espite the enactment four years ago of the Federal
Everglades Restoration Plan, America's largest wetland is most certainly not being restored").
192. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 101.
193. Id. at 103.
194. Id.
195. The district court agreed with this view, intermingling it with the idea of current, physical sepa-
ration. The court stated that the canal and the Everglades are "separate bodies of United States water
with ... different quality levels. They are two separate bodies of water because the transfer of water or
its contents from C- 11 into the Everglades would not occur naturally." Id.. The Eleventh Circuit also
seemed to accept this argument, stating that "in determining whether pollutants are added to navigable
waters for purposes of the [Act], the receiving body of water is the relevant body." ld. (quoting Micco-
sukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 1365 (1 1th Cir. 2002)).
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And it does not have the ecology of the Everglades. Nobody stands
at a gas station and says to their child, there, John, is the Ever-
glades. It .. . doesn't have Everglades water because Everglades
water would naturally flow west to east, and [the District has] ...
blocked that flow from the Everglades into the sloughs and into the
Atlantic Ocean.1
96
The tribe concluded that the District's position would destroy the statutory
protection for the ecological integrity of the Everglades and other waters of
the United States. 197
In contrast to the tribe's focus on current water chemistry conditions
and ecological integrity, the District emphasized historic physical condi-
tions, arguing that "WCA-3 and C-11 were historically part of the same
ecosystem and ... they remain hydrologically related."' 98 Overcoming wa-
ter law's traditional proclivity to separate surface and groundwater,1 99 the
District emphasized that the Everglades region is an unconfined aquifer
such that "there is no meaningful distinction between ground and surface
waters."2°° As a consequence, the District argued, the canal and wetlands
"are not distinct water bodies at all, but instead are two hydrologically indis-
tinguishable parts of a single water body." As an alternative and more
aggressive argument, the District advanced the "unitary waters" theory un-
der which all navigable waters throughout the nation "should be viewed
unitarily for purposes of [Clean Water Act] permitting" requirements. °2 In
its commitment to the unified treatment of all surface and ground water
within the Everglades-and possibly within the entire nation-the District
necessarily disavowed a commitment to biological and ecosystem integrity.
Rather, the District argued for interbasin water transfers unregulated by the
Clean Water Act:
If we read the Clean Water Act to require... [a] permit for every
engineered diversion of one navigable water into another, thousands
of new permits might have to be issued, particularly by western
States, whose water supply networks often rely on engineered trans-
fers among various natural water bodies.20 3
196. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 185, at 41.
197. At oral argument, counsel for the tribe stated that the defendants' interpretation of the Clean
Water Act would allow dischargers "to dispose of... pollutants anywhere in the United States with a
navigable water of any designated use or of any water quality standard and would decimate the Clean
Water Act's protection not only of the Everglades, but of the case law that-that your Honors have had
cited in the brief." Id. at 54-55.
198. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95. 113 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part), The United States as amicus curiae supported the District as defendant-petitioner.
199. See infra Part IV.C.
200. Brief of Petitioner at *4, Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626).
20L. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 109.
202. Id. at 98.
203. Id. at 108 (citing to the amnicus brief for Colorado and others on behalf of the petitioners, 2002
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The District cloaked its position in the language of federalism, suggesting
that application of the federal water quality controls to state diversions
would improperly impair the states' authority to allocate quantities of water
within their jurisdictions. 204
The Court methodically waded through the various notions of integrity
advanced by the parties. Similar to her opinion in PUD No. 1, Justice
O'Connor began her analysis with a quotation of the statutory purpose "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters." 20 5 But the Court's vision for transforming that aspiration
into concrete legal requirements remains largely inscrutable.2° Some of the
Court's language suggests that its primary focus is upon ecosystem integ-
rity. For example, it acknowledges that the reduction of phosphorus is nec-
essary to "restore the ecological integrity of the Everglades." 20 7 The Court
also mused that the Clean Water Act's structure "suggests that the Act pro-
tects individual water bodies as well as the 'waters of the United States' as a
whole., 20 8 On the other hand, some of the Court's statements indicate a reli-
ance upon linguistic integrity, treating all the navigable waters of the United
States as a single legal entity. 2° 9 For example, the Court indicated that the
unitary waters legal argument would be available to the petitioner on re-
mand, even though it had not raised the argument before the Eleventh Cir-
cuit or in its briefs for petition for certiorari.2 1° Moreover, the Court indi-
cated its willingness to treat surface and ground water unitarily, at least in
the Everglades: "Because Everglades soil is extremely porous, water flows
easily between ground and surface waters, so much so that '[g]round and
surface waters are essentially the same thing.'
211
III. ECOSYSTEM INTEGRITY
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.
U.S. Briefs 626, at *2-*4).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 102 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000)).
206. In their subsequent press releases, both sides claimed victory before the U.S. Supreme Court.
See, e.g., News Release, South Florida Water Management District, U.S. Supreme Court Decision "A
Victory for the Everglades" (Mar. 23, 2004), available at http://www.sfwmd.govnewsr/3_04_newsrel.ht
ml (stating that the Supreme Court "today ruled in favor of the South Florida Water Management Dis-
trict (SFWMD) in overtuming the lower court's decision that would have forced water managers across
the country to change their operational procedures").
207. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 102.
208. Id. at 107.
209. Justice Scalia, who dissented in part, noted in oral argument that the unitary waters theory,
although extreme in its practical ramifications, "is really textually not very extreme at all." Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 185, at 16.
210. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. at 109.
211. Id. at 110.
2005) 1035




Part II considered the notions of chemical and physical integrity. In Part
III, the focus expands to the concept of ecosystem integrity, which refers to
the complex interrelationships of water, flora, fauna, and land. As explained
below-and as Aldo Leopold reminds us-ecological integrity has dimen-
sions both technical and ethical.
The phrase "ecological integrity" is redundant, composed of two words
independently evocative of the idea of wholeness. The adjective "ecologi-
cal" refers to the science of ecology, the study of the interrelationship of
organisms and their physical environment.2 1 3 Coining the term "Oecologie"
in 1866, German biologist Ernst Heinrich Haeckel described it as "the in-
vestigation of the total relations of the animal both to its inorganic and its
organic environment. '2 14 Emphasizing the importance of the inorganic or
nonliving environment included in Haeckel's definition, British ecologist
Sir Arthur Tansley introduced the term "ecosystem" in 1935, defining it as a
system "of which plants and animals are components, though not the only
components. ' 21" Bringing the concept of ecology to the public conscious-
ness in the mid-twentieth century, Aldo Leopold wrote of a "land ethic" that
"simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters,
plants, and animals, or collectively: the land., 216 Roughly contemporane-
ously, Eugene Odum also emphasized the importance of both living and
nonliving matter, describing the ecosystem as "a system composed of biotic
communities and their abiotic environment interacting with each other.",
217
Water is certainly preeminent among these abiotic, inorganic, nonliving
environmental components, bearing an intimate relationship to all forms of
life.
The phrase "ecological integrity" is also redundant in its ethical conno-
tations. Just as amorality is the antithesis of integrity, so also is ecology
devoid of morality an incomplete concept. As Aldo Leopold noted around
1953, the science of ecology has ethical implications. Two decades later-
following turmoil over the war in Vietnam, the struggle for civil rights, and
the threats posed by pollution-the social implications of ecology achieved
widespread recognition. Of particular interest was ecology's suggestion that
212. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM ROUND
RIVER 262 (1953).
213. See EUGENE P. ODuM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 25 (2d ed. 197 1). For a discussion of the
historical development of the science of ecology, see ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE:
ECOSYSTEMS, DEMOCRACY, AND AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS 47-65 (2003).
214. ERNST HEINRICH HAECKEL, GENERELLE MORPHOLOGIE DER ORGANISMEN, quoted in DONALD
WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 192 (2nd ed. 1994).
215. Arthur Tansley, The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms, 16 ECOLOGY 284, 301
(1935).
216. LEOPOLD, supra note 212, at 239. See generally KEITER, supra note 213, at 65-66; Joseph Sax,
The Ecosystem Approach: New Departures for Land and Water Closing Remarks, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883
(1997).
217. BETTY JEAN CRAIGE & EUGENE ODUM: ECOSYSTEM ECOLOGIST AND ENVIRONMENTALIST Xii
(2002), available at http:/lwww.cha.uga.edulbjc/Odum-ntro.htrn.
1036 [Vol. 56:4:1009
HeinOnline  -- 56 Ala. L. Rev.  1036 2004-2005
On Integrity
humans were simply one interdependent part of nature, rather than its cen-
tral focus. Time Magazine declared 1969 the "year of ecology," recognized
Eugene Odum and others for their leading work in the discipline, and as-
serted that the pollution would "soon replace the Viet Nam war as the na-
tion's major issue of protest. '2 l8 Only months later, Newsweek Magazine
welcomed the "Age of Ecology" and its important lessons about the "web of
life. 219 Consciously linking ecology and ethical imperative in 1985, Bill
Devall and George Sessions began their book Deep Ecology with the obser-
vation, "we assume that the environmental/ecology movement has been a
response to the awareness by many people that something is drastically
wrong, out of balance in our contemporary culture." 220 Using the science of
ecology as a springboard, Deep Ecology looked to philosophy, psychology,
and sociology to develop a biocentric nature ethic that rejected the norm of
221human domination.
The case study of Part II.A describes the exploding population growth
of southern and southwestern Florida, and potential efforts to capture the
seemingly abundant water of North Florida to support the growth of the
South. In basic terms, the case study asks to what extent water should be
removed from the land, both legally and physically. Part III.B provides a
brief historical overview of the common law of water, its recognition of
water as a resource distinct from the land, and the prevalence of interbasin
water transfers. Part III.C considers the opportunity in Florida to develop a
water transfer policy premised upon integrity. Although the notion of eco-
system integrity cannot resolve Florida's water supply problems, it can
frame the discussion in transparent terms. Technically, it mandates a focus
on the ecosystem as a whole; and ethically it highlights the value choices
implicated by water allocation and other resource decisions.
A. Case Study: The Rapid Growth of South Florida
For more than a century, many states have permitted transbasin diver-
sions of their waters.222 Observers have regarded such diversions with a
range of intense reactions, ranging from pride at engineering ingenuity to
dismay at ecological disruption. Water-rich Florida, with an average annual
rainfall of 54 inches, 223 has remained on the sidelines, experiencing little
need for extensive manipulation of its water resources. But the twin pres-
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY 3 (1985).
221. The ethical imperatives of ecology certainly have their share of detractors. See, e.g., Gregory J.
Hobbs, Jr., Ecological Integrity, New Western Myth: A Critique of the Long's Peak Report, 24 ENVTL. L.
157, 158 (1994) (criticizing the so-called Long's Peak Report for favoring an "anti-storage, anti-use,
anti-local-government agenda" surrounded by the "strident din of preservationism").
222. See infra Part n.B (discussing transbasin diversions).
223. Florida Council of 100, Improving Florida's Water Supply Management Structure 4, Sept. 2003
[hereinafter Florida Council of 100], available at http://www.fclOO.org/documents/waterreportfinal.pdf
(last visited Aug. 17, 2004).
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sures of rapid population growth, particularly in southern and southwestern
Florida, and increased consumption have made water allocation policy a
recent issue of statewide concern and bitter debate.224
The issue made its dramatic and sudden appearance on the public stage
with a September 2003 publication entitled, Improving Florida's Water
Supply Management Structure.25 The report's institutional author, the Flor-
ida Council of 100, describes itself as a "private, non-profit, non-partisan
association whose members represent a cross-section of key business lead-
ers in Florida."22 6 Others have suggested that the Council is more political
than it acknowledges. The Jacksonville Business Journal, for example, de-
scribes the Council as "a formidable political force with easy access to the
highest state officials and the ability to push an issue such as water alloca-
tion to the top of the Florida Legislature's agenda," noting that its member-
ship includes leading political fundraisers.
227
No doubt mindful of the political ramifications of its report, the Council
couched its recommendations in careful generalities. Nevertheless, three of
the Council's recommendations were particularly controversial. First, the
Council's report called for the "[e]stablish[ment] [of] a Water Supply
Commission, with a statewide perspective, to ensure an adequate water sup-
ply to sustain the environment and accommodate forecasted population
growth. 2 2 8 Second, the report recommended finding "ways to encourage
public-private partnerships and public-public partnerships.' 229 Finally, the
report recommended conducting an "analysis to determine [the] practicality
of a statewide water distribution system that ensures all safeguards for fu-
ture growth and protection of the environment" and that would transfer wa-
ter from water-rich areas to water-poor areas.2 30 In public statements, the
Chairman of the Council attempted to quell anticipated public opposition.
For exampie, he stated, "We are not, I repeat, we are not recommending the
transfer of water from the north to the south .... Let's just conduct good
science-fact-based analyses.",
231
224. The Florida Department of Environmental Protection has estimated that Florida's population
will increase 25% by 2020. Id.
225. Id. The issue has garnered public attention sporadically over time. See Greg C. Bruno, The Fight
for Water: The Old Debate Heats Up Again, GAINESVILLE SUN, Oct. 11, 2003, at IA.
226. Florida Council of 100, supra note 223, at 2.
227. P. Douglas Filaroski, Council of 100 Is Low-Key, But Influential, JACKSONVILLE BUS. 3., Nov.
7, 2003, available at http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2003/1 1/10/story3.html; see
also Bruno, supra note 225 (observing that the Council's chairman is a Tampa Bay real estate broker).
228. Florida Council of 100, supra note 223, at 20 (Recommendation 1).
229. Id. at 23 (Recommendation 4). The commentary accompanying the recommendation favored
"[a]llowing market-driven forces to play a role in water management ... [andi lease lands for water
supply development to public water suppliers." Id.
230. Id. (Recommendation 5). The commentary accompanying the recommendation asserted: "De-
veloping a system that enables water distribution from water-rich areas to water-poor areas seems to
make good environmental and economic sense." Id. Furthermore, the commentary advocated "estab-
lishl[ing] an economic value to water" and "involv[ing] the private sector in a public/private solution."
Id-
231. Lloyd Dunkelberger, Statewide Water Transfer Plan Advances, GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 26,
2003, at 4A (quoting Lee Arnold, Chairman, Florida Council of 100 Water Management Task Force);
1038 [Vol. 56:4:1009
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Despite such assurances, the public was quick to fill in the report's
rather sparse and skeletal language with a variety of negative interpreta-
tions. Opposition forces galvanized rapidly, holding meetings in a variety of
homely venues such as camp gymnasiums and small-town high school audi-
toriums. Speaker after speaker declared protective sentiments to tumultuous
applause, making statements such as: "[O]ur water is not for sale., 232 The
rhetoric of the debate is instructive, highlighting the extent to which poli-
cymakers and the public consider integrity to be a central aspect of water
policy. A few critics have spoken explicitly in terms of social or temporal
integrity, asserting claims such as: "I think someone from time to time
needs to step to the forefront and say, 'This is wrong"'; 233 and "[I]t does us
no good to develop if we spend generations worth of water. ' '11 4 The major-
ity of commentary, however, has focused upon two objections with no di-
rect link to the idea of hydrologic integrity. First, some have opposed the
notion of privatizing water under a market system. 235 As a corollary of the
first criticism, others have asserted a protectionist rationale against the
transfer of water from northern and rural Florida to southern and urban ar-
eas.
2 36
see also Bruno, supra note 225 (quoting Lee Arnold as saying that "[tihis whole idea of carting water
hundreds and hundreds of miles at this point, in Florida, doesn't make any sense").
232. This observation was made by the author during attendance at the Florida Water Congress in
High Springs, Florida on December 4, 2003 (sponsored by Alachua County and the City of Gainesville).
The conference organizers described the event as a "call to action ... [that] will focus on the themes of
urgency, unity, and protection to inform and strengthen local leadership on the critical issues of water
policy." Press Release, Florida Water Congress (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://news.co.alachua.fl.us/
view story.asp?ID= 1069,
233. Cindy Swirko, Hawthorne Man Spurs Water Fight, GAINESVILLE SUN, Oct. l1, 2003, at 4A
(quoting John Martin, City Commissioner, Hawthorne, Florida), available at http://search.gainesville.co
m/apps/pbcsldlllarticle?AID=/2003101 llocal/210110337&searchlD=73201866306246.
234. Florida Water Congress, supra note 232 (statement of Florida state Senator Rod Smith).
235. See, e.g., Dunkelberger, supra note 23 1, at 4A (quoting the assertion of a Hawthorne City Attor-
ney: "The fact that they are even setting into motion a plan to privatize a public resource is abominable..
.. It's just another circumstance of state government privatizing state resources."); Florida Water Coali-
tion, Water for Florida's Future: A Call for Leadership, Jan. 2003 (fearing that "multinational corpora-
tions [will] snatch up huge quantities of Florida water," "get a stranglehold on water supply," and then
"dictate the public's price for water--selling back at a premium what was ours to begin with"); Curtis
Morgan, Water-Use Plan Faces Opposition, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 15, 2003, at 6, available at
http://www.miami.commld/miamiherald/newsn70l5702.htm?lc (observing that "the Broward County
Commission joined nearly 30 other counties in passing a resolution opposing the plan, saying they object
to any legislation that shifts water use from a 'publicly regulated process to a market-driven process');
Press Release, Florida Water Congress, supra note 232 (noting that "[r]ecently, public anxiety has been
mounting regarding possible changes to state water policy that may encourage the long distance pipelin-
ing and privatization of water resources").
236. See Amy Wimmer Schwarb, Plan to Transfer Water Meets Sea of Protest, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003; Florida Water Congress, supra note 232 (quoting Mike Byerly, Chair, Alachua
County Commission, for the proposition that the "water of north Florida should remain in control of the
people of north Florida," and pledging that "we're not pumping one bit of water south"); Id. (quoting
Rod Smith, Florida Senator, District 14, for the proposition that "our water is not for sale"); Swirko,
supra note 233, at 4A (quoting Hawthorne City Commissioner John Martin's statement that "[i]f they
take water from here [north Florida], they are making a situation in South Florida-with their over-
growth and sprawl-worse and at the same time literally suckling] the life's blood out from under our
part of the state"); Bruno, supra note 225, at 4A (observing that "environmentalists and state water-
watchers fear that it's the privatization and piping of North Florida water that the council has in mind").
But see Morgan, supra note 235 (quoting Broward Commissioner Kristin Jacobs: "It would seem to me
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The critical significance of the Florida debate is easy to overlook. The
dry, understated tone of the Council's recommendations threatens to ob-
scure their potential to revolutionize Florida water law. Similarly, the
wholesale rejection and protectionist tone of critics may prevent their objec-
tions from receiving the careful consideration they deserve. Political grand-
standing aside, Florida's debate over water transfers squarely raises issues
central to hydrologic integrity: Under what circumstances, if any, should
water be transported across political and hydrologic lines? Furthermore,
should water remain as a pure public good, or should the right to use water
be transformed into a market commodity that can be traded privately?
Florida provides a unique laboratory in which to study the policy of wa-
ter transfers from a fresh perspective. Unlike many other states, Florida has
enacted a comprehensive statutory framework for the allocation of water
that integrates surface and groundwater, as well as quality and quantity con-
siderations. As such, comprehensive change could occur rather rapidly with
the stroke of the legislative pen, rather than with the painstaking accumula-
tion of common-law guidance. And although Florida itself has little or no
practical experience with large-scale water transfers,237 it can look to its
sister states-particularly in the West-for the accumulated wisdom
gleaned from more than a century of water transfers.238
B. The Historical Context: Separating Land and Water
The Florida case study implicates delicate questions of social and eco-
logical policy: When population exceeds water supply in a particular region,
is it the job of government to bring water to the people, or to encourage
people to live within the carrying capacity of the land? Almost univer-
sally-and perhaps with little introspection-states have assumed the re-
sponsibility to expand the water supply to meet whatever demands the fu-
ture may pose.239
The human imagination has refused to accept the natural, geographic
distribution of water as a limit upon where people may settle and build their
that it's nothing more than a smoke screen to pit the north and south against each other so [profiteers]
can go in and begin to privatize," and "The south doesn't want the north's water"); Dunkelberger, supra
note 23 1, at 4A (describing "opponents in water-rich North Central Florida who claim 'partnerships' will
become little more than veiled water grabs by resource-depleted South Florida developers").
237. Dunkelberger, supra note 231 (stating that "virtually no regional water transfers occur, while
local communities have become too protective of their water supplies"). Lee Arnold is quoted for the
proposition that "[wlaters are not restricted to county lines, or district lines.... The Floridan aquifer
doesn't flow along neat little political boundaries." Id.
238. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443,449-50 (1882).
239. For a challenge to the idea that there are no limits to human settlement, see A. Dan Tarlock, A
Brief Examination of the History of the Persistent Debate About Limits to Western Growth, 10
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 155, 157 (2004):
Urmits [to human settlement] were an academic subject, but not a subject for serious policy.
However, the limits question has now become the subject of serious, respectable debate as the
role of government in promoting regional growth recedes at the same time that population
growth in many water-short areas continues to surge.
1040 [Vol. 56:4:1009
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communities. Rather than move people to abundant water supplies, we have
preferred instead to move water to the people. At times, this denial of the
force of natural limitations has reached comic proportions. As the Atlantic
Monthly reported in 2002:
The possibility of towing icebergs to the Middle East and other arid
regions around the world was studied and widely discussed during
the 1970s. Nothing much came of the idea, for a number of reasons,
chief among them being that it was stupid. (One report noted that it
would take 128 days to tow an iceberg from Antarctica to the Mid-
dle East-twenty-four days longer than it would take for the iceberg
to melt.)2 40
Twenty years later, a more workable version of the proposal became a real-
ity, as a private water-supply company began using ocean tankers to tow
large, fresh-water filled floating bladders to the Greek islands. 4'
Traditional riparian doctrine recognized an intimate connection between
water and land. Under riparianism, the use of water was limited to those
who owned land contiguous to a natural watercourse.242 The early natural
flow doctrine gave riparian landowners the right to receive the flow of the
243stream past their land undiminished in quantity or quality. As a practical
consequence, this limited the geographic range of water use to the adjacent
property or to the original watershed. As expressed through the traditional
on-tract limitation, riparian rights must be used only on the adjacent riparian
parcel.2 "
During the early nineteenth century, the restrictive natural flow doctrine
began to give way to the more flexible reasonable use doctrine. Under that
development, the right to use water remains tied to the ownership of riparian
property, but riparian uses may alter the natural stream flow, provided that
such uses do not interfere with the correlative rights of other riparians to
make reasonable use of the watercourse. 45 Many reasonable use jurisdic-
tions invoke the watershed limitation-a rule slightly more generous than
240. Wayne Curtis, The Iceberg Wars, Competition for One of Newfoundland's Chief Natural Re-
sources Heats Up, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2002, at 76 (emphasis added).
241. See Alister Doyle, Sea-Going Water Bags to Quench World Thirst?, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE,
Nov. 27, 2001.
242. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under "Pure" Riparian Rights, in 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2001 repl. vol.) (stating that the right to use
water "pertains to the owner of riparian land, often on the basis ... [of] protecting the 'natural advan-
tage' which goes with the land").
243. Under the natural flow theory, "[e]ach riparian owner on a waterbody is entitled to have the
water flow across, or lie upon, the land in its natural condition, without alteration by others of the rate of
flow, or the quantity or quality of the water." Id. § 7.02(c).
244. Id. § 7.02(a)(2) (discussing "unity of title" and "source of title" tests for determining the scope
of riparian lands on which water may be used).
245. Id. § 7.02(d) ("Under the reasonable use theory each owner of riparian land is permitted to make
use of the water in a waterbody regardless of the effect the use has on the natural flow so long as each
user does not transgress the equal right of other riparians to use the water.").
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the on-tract limitation. Under this limit, water may be used on nonriparian
lands, but only if those lands are located in the same watershed as the source
from which the water was removed.246 The reasonable use version of ripari-
anism remains the dominant paradigm today in the states that still follow a
common-law regime.247
Thus, both versions of common-law riparianism emphasize an affinity
between water rights and land ownership. This connection may have tenu-
ous roots in an ecological impulse. 248 More likely, however, the desire to
protect the flow of watercourses was economic or pragmatic in nature:
At a time when aesthetic or ecological concerns were not often rec-
ognized by the law, courts while perhaps intuitively embracing such
concerns, found it difficult to express them except through asser-
tions of a property right in the natural flow of a waterbody. The
evident overstatement of the asserted right was not troublesome
when the most commercially productive uses of water were simple
navigation and the turning of small-scale water wheels, both non-
consumptive uses being best served by keeping the water more or
less in its natural condition.249
Likewise, in 1938 the California Supreme Court provided a rationale for the
watershed rule rooted in the norms of property law:
The principal reasons for the [watershed] rule ... are that... [the
water] will, after ... use, return to the stream, so far as it is not con-
sumed, and that, as the rainfall on such land feeds the stream, the
land is in consequence entitled, so to speak, to the use of its wa-
ters. °
246. Id. § 7.02(a)(2) (describing the watershed rule as "a vestige of the natural flow theory"). A
"watershed" can be defined as "that area of land off which precipitation runs into a particular waterbody.
Thus two sides of a particular hill or land showing even slight changes in the slope of the land can lie in
different watersheds because the water will drain in different directions." Id.
247. Id. § 7.02(c) (describing the impracticality and lack of importance of the natural flow theory
today) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 cmt. b (1979)).
248. Dellapenna, supra note 242, § 7.02(a)(2) (stating that "a few scholars have championed the
natural flow theory ... as protective of the ecological interest in streamflow maintenance") (citing Lynda
Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship
Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PiTt. L. REV. 95, 156-81 (1985)); Peter N. Davis, The Ripar-
ian Right of Streamflow Protection in the Eastern States, 36 ARK. L. REV. 47 (1982). But see Belin v.
Dep't of Envtl. Res., 291 A.2d 553, 555 (Penn. 1972) (rejecting the watershed rule despite the plaintiffs'
argument that riparianism prohibits the transbasin diversion and discharge of cooling and effluent waters
from a manufacturing plant).
249. Dellapenna, supra note 242, § 7.02(c) (observing that "a rule [such as the natural flow theory]
prohibiting material alterations of the water would preserve the water necessary to turn more water-
wheels downstream, and thus serve to maximize the wealih of society as a whole") (quoting A. DAN
TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3.21 [1] (1988)).
250. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 549 (Cal. 1938).
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Ironically, some of the strongest support for the watershed rule comes from
the western states in so-called "hybrid" jurisdictions that follow a mix of
both ripiarianism and prior appropriation. Far from desiring to preserve the
ecological integrity of water and land, these states may have a convoluted
agenda: to reduce the land base to which riparianism applies, thus inciden-
tally reducing the acreage to which the watershed rule potentially at-
taches.251
Whatever motivated the courts in traditional riparian jurisdictions to
recognize a link between water and riparian land, the rules have been re-
laxed when economic progress so demanded.252 Today, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts rejects both the on-tract253 and watershed limitations.5 4
Among the common-law riparian states, approximately four allow inter-
basin water transfers, at least in theory, and at least under some conditions;
similarly, at least 14 states following a statutory version of riparianism also
allow interbasin transfers under some conditions. 5
Perhaps the greatest relaxation of the water-land connection has oc-
curred in the context of urban water supply. Despite the basic tenet that ri-
parian water rights accrue only to riparian landowners, the common law has
recognized various exceptions to allow cities to acquire a secure water sup-
ply. 6 New York City, for example, looks to the relatively rural upstate
basins to augment its local water supply. 257 As one commentator notes, "In-
terbasin transfers of water have engendered considerable controversy, and
outbreaks of often complex litigation. The New York diversions, for exam-
ple, required two trips to the US Supreme Court. 258
251. As one commentator observed, "Western courts, with their ingrained hostility toward riparian
rights, have embraced the watershed rule strongly because the rule tends to diminish the land to which a
riparian right applies." Dellapenna, supra note 242, § 7.02(a)(2).
252 Id. § 7.02(c) (commenting that the natural flow theory "has been displaced in the United States
whenever it threatens to prevent the commercially valuable development of water resources").
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 855 (1979).
254. Id. § 43 cmt. d.
255. AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASS'N, WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 72 (Ken-
neth R. Wright, ed. 1998) [hereinafter AWWA]. The information was derived from a survey submitted
to each of the states, and somewhat ambiguously described in a simplified presentation. The lack of
clarity results from the fact that although "states have followed various informal policies in evaluating
and regulating interbasin transfers, few have adopted explicit regulations prescribing the terms under
which inter-watershed transfers would be permitted." R. Timothy Weston et al., Adequate Water Rights
and Enhancing the Supply, in AWWA, supra, at 72. Of the common-law states, it appears that the fol-
lowing have relaxed, or do not follow, the watershed limitation: New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Rhode Island. The statutory riparian states following a similar practice include Arkansas, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Jersey, New York, and Virginia.
256. See Dimmock v. City of New London, 245 A.2d 569, 572 (Conn. 1968); Purcellville v. Potts, 19
S.E.2d 700, 703 (Va. 1942).
257. Weston et al., supra note 255, at 72 (describing "a network of reservoirs, aqueducts, and pipe-
lines, [that transfer] up to 800 [million gallons per day] from the Delaware Basin to the city's Hudson
Basin service area") (citing New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 997 (1954)). New York City's
importation of water from the Catskill Mountains was the subject of litigation considered above in Part
II.B,4.
258. Weston et al., supra note 255, at 72 (citing New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931);
New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 997 (1954)).
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In contrast to the riparian doctrine, the western doctrine of prior appro-
priation not only allowed water to be transported long distances from its
source, but generally required some sort of diversion or removal of water
from its original source to perfect an appropriation .259 Early descriptions of
the western doctrine were couched in terms of an emphatic separation of
water from the land. In 1882, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court
forcefully rejected the riparian doctrine, noting the "disastrous conse-
quences" that it would bring about in the western states:
260
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual
rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections,
artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in
the various streams thus acquires a value unknown in moister
climes. Instead of being a mere incident to the soil, it rises, when
appropriated, to the dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate, or right
of property.... [We have always encouraged] the diversion and use
of water in this country for agriculture; and vast expenditures of
time and money have been made in reclaiming and fertilizing by ir-
rigation portions of our unproductive territory. Houses have been
built, and permanent improvements made; the soil has been culti-
vated, and thousands of acres have been rendered immensely valu-
able .... Deny the doctrine of... superiority of right by priority of
appropriation, and a great part of the value of all this property is at
once destroyed.26 t
Indeed, several western states elevated to constitutional status the right to
divert water out of natural watercourses for use on distant lands or in distant
watersheds .262
Under the western doctrine, interbasin water transfers are quite com-
mon. A 1990 survey of all the states found that each of the 17 states follow-
ing the appropriation doctrine for surface water allocation allowed the buy-
ing and selling of water rights independent of land.263
Thus, the prior appropriation doctrine generally supports the free
movement of water, divorced from the landscape of its origin. This practice
is discussed generally in pragmatic terms, with little or no weighing of the
ecological costs or benefits of separating water from the land. In a few in-
stances, appropriation states may recognize explicitly the conflicting values
259. Christine A. Klein, The Constitutional Mythology of Western Water Law, 14 VA. ENvTL. L. J.
343, 365 (1995).
260. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882).
261. Id. at 446.
262. Klein, supra note 259, at 344.
263. AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASs'N, WATER RIGHTS OF THE FIFTY STATES AND TERRITORIES 32-
33 (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1990). In contrast, only 15 of the 28 states allocating surface water rights
under the riparian doctrine allowed for the purchase and sale of water rights. Id.; see also NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW CENTER, TRANSFERRING WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES-A COMPARISON
OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 53-62 (1989).
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at stake-ecological integrity and economic development-and, almost
without exception, choose the latter over the former. In some cases, the
courts have been apologetic for the ecological damage they were facilitat-
ing.
264
At other times, however, the courts unabashedly chose economic devel-
opment over ecological integrity. In United States v. New Mexico,2 65 the
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a general stream adjudication by the State of
New Mexico, through which it allocated water rights to numerous users of
the Rio Mimbres.266 As the Court noted, the river was used for a variety of
ecological and industrial purposes: "The river originates in the upper
reaches of the Gila National Forest, but during its course it winds more than
50 miles past privately owned lands and provides substantial water for both
irrigation and mining., 267 In particular, the Court considered "what quantity
of water, if any, the United States reserved out of the Rio Mimbres when it
set aside the Gila National Forest in 1899.,,26" As the Court acknowledged,
when Congress reserved a portion of the federal domain for a specific fed-
eral purpose such as a national forest, it impliedly reserved enough water to
269
accomplish the purpose of the reservation. Under the facts of the case, the
Court narrowly construed the legislation establishing the national forests as
evidencing only two congressional purposes for the creation of national
forests: "to conserve water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of tim-
ber for the people. 2 70 In so holding, the Court declined to recognize an ar-
guable third purpose of national forests suggested by the literal language of
statutory purpose-"to improve and protect the forest. ' 271 Instead, the Court
held that aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or wildlife-preservation
uses were not among the primary purposes for which forests were estab-
lished and water rights reserved.272 Therefore, the Court rejected the Forest
Service's claim that Congress intended in 1899 to reserve sufficient water
264. Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123, 129 (8th Cir. 1913) (holding that
the owner of a tourist resort was "not entitled to a continuance of [certain waterfalls] solely for their
scenic beauty" but observing that "if the attention of the lawmakers had been directed to such natural
objects of great beauty [it may be that] they would have sought to preserve them, but we think the domi-
nant idea was utility, liberally and not narrowly regarded, and we are constrained to follow it").
265. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
266. Id. at 697-98.
267. Id. at 697.
268. Id. at 698.
269. Id. at 700.
270. Id. at 707-08. The Court based its conclusion on the following statutory language:
No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the
boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish
a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States; but
it is not the purpose or intent of these provisions . . . to authorize the inclusion therein of
lands more valuable for the mineral therein, or for agricultural purposes, than for forest pur-
poses.
Id. (interpreting the Organic Administration Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 35 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 475) (2000)).
271. Id. at 708 n. 14.
272. Id. at 707-08.
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for wildlife purposes and to maintain a minimum stream flow to preserve
fish.
27 3
In rendering its decision, the Court explicitly acknowledged the compet-
ing values at stake, but chose not to promote ecosystem integrity. The Court
observed that federal reserved water rights "will frequently require a gallon-
for-gallon reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state
and private appropriators. This reality has not escaped the attention of Con-
gress and must be weighed in determining what, if any, water Congress
reserved for use in the national forests."274 It was only Justice Powell's dis-
sent that mourned the ecological loss that might follow from the Court's
separation of water from the land:
I do not agree... that the forests which Congress intended to "im-
prove and protect" are the still, silent, lifeless places envisioned by
the Court. In my view, the forests consist of the birds, animals, and
fish-the wildlife-that inhabit them, as well as the trees, flowers,
shrubs, and grasses. I therefore would hold that the United States is
entitled to so much water as is necessary to sustain the wildlife of
the forests, as well as the plants.2 75
Justice Powell cited to ecological treatises for the proposition that forest and
wildlife are intimately linked in an interdependent, dynamic community.
276
He concluded with a plea for recognition of the legal and ecological integ-
rity of water and land: "It is inconceivable that Congress envisioned the
forests it sought to preserve as including only inanimate components such as
the timber and flora. Insofar as the Court holds otherwise, the 55th Congress
is maligned and the Nation is the poorer, and I dissent.,
277
C. The Opportunity: Regulating Transbasin Diversions in Florida
Florida has been presented with the opportunity to fashion a statewide
water transfer policy that advances integrity, writing on a clean slate unen-
cumbered by the weight of legal precedent or detrimental reliance. As with
many endeavors, asking the right questions may pose a challenge as great as
determining the correct response. This subsection will highlight briefly the
relevant considerations that might form the basis of a policy that allocates a
scarce resource in accordance with principles of scientific, ecological, so-
cial, and historical integrity. Although the context is specific to Florida, the
broad concept of advancing the integrity of water transfer policy is equally
applicable to all of the states.
273. Id. at 715-17.
274. Id. at 705.
275. Id. at 719 (Powell, J., dissenting in part); see also Adler, supra note 5.
276. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 723-24.
277. Id.
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Despite their diverse histories, both riparian and appropriation jurisdic-
tions today have incorporated a variety of measures to protect the integrity
of aquatic ecosystems. Most western states protect "minimum stream flows"
(or "instream flows"), by determining flow levels of particular stream seg-
ments below which new appropriations will not be permitted. In the West,
all but three states had adopted such programs by 1988.278 The programs are
relatively modest in scope-at times, deliberately so-in order to avoid
triggering a backlash by diversionary users. Three primary limitations are
apparent. First, as their name implies, minimum stream flows generally
maintain only the minimum volume of water necessary to accomplish spe-
279cific, environmental purposes. In addition, most instream flow programs
are of relatively recent vintage, and can only guard against diversions by
subsequent users with more recent priority dates. Moreover, the authority to
protect stream flows may be reserved to specific governmental entities,
rather than to individuals or public interest groups. Despite these limita-
tions, minimum stream flow programs have made a significant contribution
to the maintenance of aquatic habitats. For example, Colorado's governor
issued an "honorary proclamation" in 2004, recognizing the thirtieth anni-
versary of the state's stream and lake protection program. As noted by the
proclamation, the state has "secured water rights for more than 475 natural
lakes and over 8,000 miles of Colorado stream., 280 Riparian states also in-
corporate stream flow protections into their legal regimes. As of 1998, at
least 26 of the 31 eastern states had adopted such measures.28'
Ecosystem integrity can also be promoted by "basin of origin" legisla-
tion that imposes some limits on the transfer of water from its natural source
to distant regions or watersheds within the state.282 From a tactical stand
point, it may be difficult to muster the political will to protect water-rich,
lightly populated areas from the aggressive behavior of water-poor regions
with greater populations, and hence greater voting power. The relative
unlikelihood of reaching a sympathetic ear may not stop source regions
from uttering a predictable series of complaints in opposition to proposed
diversions. Likewise, the area that will benefit from the potential water
278. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN. PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 21:30 (1990).
279. In Colorado, for example, instream flow water rights are authorized for the protection of "the
natural environment to a reasonable degree." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (West 2003). In practice,
the required flows are usually correlated to fishery preservation.
280. Governor Bill Owens, Honorary Proclamation, 30th Anniversary of the Stream and Lake Pro-
tection Program, June 2004 (on file with author). The proclamation observes that "the number of stream
miles and lakes protected in Colorado exceeds that of all other western states combined." Id.
281. Patricia K. Flood & Kenneth R. Wright, Summary of Water Rights Law in the 31 Eastern States,
in AWWA, supra note 255, at 105, 108-09. Among common-law jurisdictions, states with instream flow
protection include Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia;
regulated riparian states with such protection include Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
282. Without congressional approval, such state limitations on the interstate transfer of water risk
running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 942 (1982).
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transfer may not hesitate to advance its cause as an ethical imperative, even
if it has not been diligent in exploring conservation and other alternatives to
the transfer:
Political pressures will build to protect the source area even if the
public water system [of the destination area] has to pay compensa-
tion for any water taken. Cries will arise that the service area is
stealing the source area's future. People in the service area will
counter with arguments that it should not have to sacrifice present
needs for the supposed benefit of a remote future need in the source
area, a need that might never be realized. Representatives from ser-
vice areas will also argue simple economics: Let the water flow to
those willing to pay the price, even if the water must flow uphill.
283
Despite the difficulty of imposing limits on thirsty regions, a few states have
done so. In some cases, source area protection takes the form of financial
compensation. 284 In other states-most notably California-statutes provide
the source area with the ability to prevent the transfer itself.285 Such basin of
origin protection has the potential to promote ecological integrity, but it
may just as easily preserve the source area's potential for future growth,
simply deferring to some future date the threat to aquatic resources.
Florida law has established an institutional framework well-suited to
promoting integrity, depending upon how its provisions are interpreted and
implemented. In 1972, the state adopted comprehensive legislation to sup-
plant its former regime of common-law ripiarianism. 2 6 The Water Re-
sources Act of 1972 represents an early effort at watershed management,
creating five "water management districts" based upon surface water-
sheds. 87 Each district is authorized to perform a variety of tasks, including
the issuance of permits for consumptive use,2 8 8 the establishment of mini-
mum flows for surface watercourses and minimum water levels for
groundwater aquifers levels to protect water resources and ecology,28 9 the
reservation of water from use to protect natural systems and the public
health,290 and water supply planning and water resource development. 291
283. WATER & WATER RIGHTS § 7.05(c)(2) (Robert E. Beck ed., 2001 repl. vol.); Dellapenna, supra
note 242, § 7.05(c)(2). This description proved to be remarkably accurate with respect to a 2003 Florida
proposal generally supportive of transbasin diversions. See supra Part lI.B.
284. Dellapenna, supra note 242, § 7.05(c)(2).
285. Id.; see also Andrew P. Tauriainen, California 's Evolving Water Law: The Water Rights Protec-
tion and Expedited Short-Term Water Transfer Act of 1999, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 411,415 (2000);
Robert L. Harris, Narrowing the Local Public Interest Criterion in Idaho Water Right Transfers, 39
IDAHO L. REV. 713, 714 (2003).
286. Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. chs. 373.012-.71 (2004).
287. Id. at ch. 373.069 (creating and defining the boundaries of the Northwest Florida Water Man-
agement District, Suwannee River Water Management District, St. Johns River Water Management
District, Southwest Florida Water Management District, and South Florida Water Management District).
28& Id. at ch. 373.223.
289. Id. at ch- 373.042(l)-(2).
290. See, e.g., id. at chs. 373.0831, 373.1961, 373.223(4); see Robert P. King, Water Managers Take
1048 [Vol. 56:4:1009
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Notably, the statute provides a unified scheme for the consumptive use of
surface or groundwater,292 subjecting applications for either to the same
general permit requirements.29 3
Florida's water code addresses generally the question of water transfers.
As an initial premise, the law provides that water regulators may authorize
transbasin and trans-county diversions.294 Indeed, the water code specifi-
cally prohibits any local ordinances or rules to the contrary.295 However, the
statute also has a number of provisions which serve to restrict the approval
of certain water transfers. Taken together, these restrictions have been
dubbed the "local sources first 296 policy. Although opponents of water
transfers construe the policy strictly to limit water transfers,297 a close ex-
amination suggests that it is simply advisory in nature. The restrictions ap-
pear in at least three statutory sections, providing overlapping and poten-
tially contradictory requirements: (1) water regulators are directed to "en-
courage the use of water from sources nearest the area of use or application
whenever practicable";2 98 (2) for trans-county transfers of both surface and
ground water, regulators "shall consider" a variety of factors, including the
proximity of source to area of use, alternative water sources, potential envi-
ronmental impacts of the transfer, and the present and reasonably antici-
pated future needs of the source region;2 99 and (3) for groundwater transfers
Steps to Shield Loxahatchee River, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 15, 2004, at 2B.
291. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.0831 (2004).
292. The Districts may require permits for the consumptive use of water. Id. at ch. 373.219(1). The
term "water" is defined broadly to include "any and all water on or beneath the surface of the ground or
in the atmosphere." Id. at ch. 373.019(17).
293. To obtain a permit, applicants must demonstrate that the proposed use is reasonable-beneficial,
"[wlill not interfere with any presently existing legal uscs of waterf,] and [i]s consistent with the public
interest." Id. at ch. 373.223(1). The specific details of permitting may vary from district to district, and
appear as rules in the Florida Administrative Code. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 40A-2.301,
40B-2.301, 40C-2.301, 40D-2.301, 40E-2.301 (2004).
294. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.223(2) (2004).
295. The law places slightly different limitations upon the authority of local governments and the
authority of the water management districts. Local governments are specifically precluded from
"adopt[ing] or enforce[ing] any law, ordinance, rule, regulation, or order" that prohibits the "transport
and use [of] ground or surface water beyond overlying land, across county boundaries, or outside the
watershed from which it is taken." Id. at ch. 373.223(2). In slightly different language addressing
groundwater only, the water management districts and the state Department of Environmental Protection
are specifically admonished against "adoptting] special rules which prohibit or restrict interdistrict
transfer and use of groundwater in a manner inconsistent with this section." ld. at ch. 373.2295(10).
296. See RoY R. CARRIKER, INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC. ScI., Florida's Council of 100 and the Future
of Water Supply Management of Florida, at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/FE470 (Dec. 2003).
297. See id.
298. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.016(4)(a) (2004) (listing preferred sources as including desalination, conser-
vation, reuse of nonpotable reclaimed water and stormwater, and aquifer storage and recovery). The
following subsection, however, diminishes the force of this preference for local sources, stating that "[i]n
establishing the policy outlined in paragraph (a), the Legislature realizes that under certain circumstances
the need to transport water from distant sources may be necessary for environmental, technical, or eco-
nomic reasons." Id. at ch. 373.016(4)(b).
299. Id. at ch. 373.223(3). The "local sources first" policy is weakened by exceptions and qualifying
phrases. In greater detail, chapter 373.223(3) provides:
(3) Except for [water use by the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, bottled
water suppliers, certain applications with the Northwest Florida Water Management District,
and certain self-suppliers of water], when evaluating whether a potential transport and use of
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across district lines, water regulators shall consider the projected popula-
tions and future needs of both withdrawal and use areas,3° and must issue a
permit for such interdistrict transfer if the needs can be satisfied.30 ' If integ-
rity is to be the touchstone of Florida's water transfer policy, then the statu-
tory "future needs" assessment must be applied broadly enough to consider
the requirements of a sustainable ecosystem as the very heart of future hu-
man needs.
Florida's statutory scheme also contains a little-used "reservation" pro-
vision that may be essential to an integral water transfer policy. 30 2 Under
that section, water regulators, "may reserve [water] from use by permit ap-
plicants, .... as in its judgment may be required for the protection of fish
and wildlife or the public health and safety." 30 3 The statute imposes three
critical limitations on the effectiveness of reservations. First, the establish-
ground or surface water across county boundaries is consistent with the public interest....
the governing board or department shall consider:
(a) The proximity of the proposed water source to the area of use or application.
(b) All impoundments, streams, groundwater sources, or watercourses that are geo-
graphically closer to the area of use or application than the proposed source, and that are
technically and economically feasible for the proposed transport and use.
(c) All economically and technically feasible alternatives to the proposed source, in-
cluding, but not limited to, desalination, conservation, reuse of nonpotable reclaimed
water and stormwater, and aquifer storage and recovery.
(d) The potential environmental impacts that may result from the transport and use of
water from the proposed source, and the potential environmental impacts that may re-
sult from use of the other water sources identified in paragraphs (b) and (c).
(e) Whether existing and reasonably anticipated sources of water and conservation ef-
forts are adequate to supply water for existing legal uses and reasonably anticipated fu-
ture needs of the water supply planning region in which the proposed water source is
located.
(f) Consultations with local governments affected by the proposed transport and use.
(g) The value of the existing capital investment in water-related infrastructure made by
the applicant.
Id.
300. Id. at ch. 373.2295(1), (4), (11), (13). These requirements apply only where water does not cross
county lines. Id. at ch. 373.2295(1).
301. Id. at ch. 373.2295(4). In its entirety, subsection (4) provides:
(4) In determining if an application is consistent with the public interest .... the projected
populations, as contained in the future land use elements of the comprehensive plans adopted
... by the local governments ... will be considered together with other evidence presented
on future needs of (the withdrawal areas and the proposed use] areas. If the proposed interdis-
trict transfer of groundwater meets the requirements of this chapter, and if the needs of the
area where the use will occur and the specific area from which the groundwater will be with-
drawn can be satisfied, the permit for the interdistrict transfer and use shall be issued.
Id. (emphasis supplied). Additional procedural requirements apply if the proposed transfer will cross
both hydrological (water management district) and political (county) lines. Id. at ch. 373.2295(5).
302. Id. at ch. 373.223(4).
303. Id. Florida law also requires the establishment of minimum flows for all surface watercourses
and minimum water levels for aquifers, representing the limit "[beyond] which further withdrawals
would be significantly harmful to the water resources [or ecology] of the area." Id, at ch. 373.042(1). In
contrast to most western "minimum stream flow" programs, see supra notes 278-81 and accompanying
text. Florida's minimum flows and levels ("MFLs") are a water-shortage planning and prevention
mechanism, rather than an absolute protection against additional withdrawals. See FLA. STAT. ch.
373.0421(2) (2004) (requiring regulators to respond to actual or projected violations of MFLs by "expe-
ditiously implement[ing] a recovery or prevention strategy" to recover levels "as soon as practicable" or
to prevent flows or levels from dropping below established MFLs).
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ment of reservations is discretionary and sporadic, not mandatory and com-
prehensive. 304 Second-like other water uses in Florida-reservations from
use are something less than a property right (or a public right), and are
therefore vulnerable to periodic review.305 Finally, reservations are explic-
itly inferior to pre-existing uses of water.306 The inclusion of this final limi-
tation is generally incongruous with the riparian practice of granting water
rights in accordance with the public interest, rather than temporal priority.
3° 7
As a final critical component of ecosystem integrity, the relationship be-
tween water management and land use planning must be recognized. Al-
though Florida acknowledged this relationship in theory by the early 1970s,
it allowed decades to pass without implementing the link through enforce-
able legislation. In fact, a 1991 report found that the connection was still a
"missing link," and that "[e]xcept for limited provisions, Florida law does
not establish a formal link between land planning and water planning.
3°8
State lawmakers took a step toward forging that link in 2002 with the pas-
sage of legislation requiring integration of local government comprehensive
land use plans with the regional water supply plans of water regulators.0 9
IV. SOCIAL AND LEGAL INTEGRITY
Moving beyond the three aspects of integrity highlighted by the Clean
Water Act-chemical, physical, and biological (or more broadly, ecologi-
cal)-Part IV will examine the implications for water law of social and le-
gal integrity. As an indispensable, life-sustaining resource, water is perhaps
the fundamental measure of a community's wealth. Water allocation policy,
therefore, is all about the allocation of a unique and critical form of wealth.
As such, arguably, it should be subject to the same sort of scrutiny that we
give to any government program involving the distribution of wealth and
baseline safety nets, including taxation, social security, and welfare. Under
the rubric of "social integrity," Part IV.B will suggest essential considera-
tions to ensure that water is distributed fairly on a geographic and temporal
basis, arguing for recognition of the value judgments embedded in alloca-
tion mechanisms and tools.
Part IV.C will consider the extent to which water law is a discipline of
integrity. In particular, the "legal integrity" of water law will be measured
by the extent to which it accurately reflects hydrologic reality and the laws
304. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.223(4) (2004).
305. See id.
306. Id.
307. Despite this often-recited premise, priority seems to make an inexplicable appearance in many
riparian jurisdictions. In Florida, for example, permit conditions include reasonable-beneficial use,
consistency with the public interest, and a demonstration that the proposed use of water "[w]ill not
interfere with any presently existing legal use of water." Id. at ch. 373.223(1).
308. ENVT. LAND MGMT. STUDY COMM., BUILDING SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITIES 6 (1992); see also
Mary Jane Angelo, Integrating Water Management and Land Use Planning: Uncovering the Missing
Link in the Protection of Florida's Water Resources?, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 223,223 (2001).
309. See CS/SB 1906 & 550, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 296 (West 2002).
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of science. Tapping into the rich and developing literature on law and sci-
ence, two opposing problems will be noted. 10 In some instances, the law
relies too little upon science, as exemplified by water law's reluctance to
regulate groundwater long after science furnished the tools to do so. In other
instances, the law relies too much upon science, blindly depending upon it
to resolve conflicts that are matters of subjective social policy, rather than
objective scientific judgment.
To provide a practical context for the philosophical concepts of social
and legal integrity, the next section offers a case study of an ongoing dis-
pute between Alabama, Florida, and Georgia over the allocation of the Apa-
lachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint Rivers (collectively, the "ACF"). In
conclusion, Part IV.D frames the ACF dispute in terms of social and legal
integrity.
A. Case Study: Dividing a River Among
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia
In the Southeast, a network of rivers connect Atlanta, Georgia to Apala-
chicola, Florida-two cities that are about 350 miles apart in river miles, but
worlds apart in culture. Both cities are located in the 20,000 square mile
basin of the Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint Rivers (the "ACF Ba-
sin") of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.3 1 The rivers drain into the Gulf of
Mexico at the tiny fishing village of Apalachicola, Florida-boasting a
population of 2,334, according to the 2000 census.3 12 Established in 1831,
Apalachicola was prominent in the cotton shipping industry, and became the
third largest port on the Gulf of Mexico. 313 Later in the nineteenth century,
the city's industrial focus shifted toward the milling of native cypress logs
and commercial fishing.3 14 Today, the Apalachicola Bay provides over 90%
of the oysters consumed in Florida and 10% of the nation's supply, support-
ing a regional commercial fishing industry worth $100 million annually."-
As one writer has observed, "Oysters occupy such a central place in the
economy of the town that the local radio station has the call letters WOYS
and bills itself as 'Oyster Radio, 100.5. ' ' '316 A successful tourist industry has
310. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science in
Environmental Law, 27 VT. L. REV. 249,250 (2003).
311. As described by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, "The Chattahoochee River
originates in the mountains of northern Georgia, runs along the Alabama-Georgia border, joins the Flint
River at the Florida-Georgia border (becoming the Apalachicola River), and eventually flows into the
Gulf of Mexico [at Apalachicola Bay, near Apalachicola, Florida]." S. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v.
Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26, 28 (D.D.C. 2004).
312. Apalachicola, Florida, Fact-Index, at http:/Iwww.fact-index.com/alap/apalachicola_ flor-
ida.html (2000).




316. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES, GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA'S
FRESH WATERS 185 (2002).
[Vol. 56:410091052
HeinOnline  -- 56 Ala. L. Rev.  1052 2004-2005
On Integrity
also developed along this so-called "forgotten coast" of Florida, emphasiz-
ing the slow, old-south atmosphere that still permeates the area. 317 As noted
by one contributor to the online newspaper, the Forgotten Coast Line, "One
problem with Apalachicola is it's way too easy to get comfortable. Indo-
lence lurks seductively about every comer, waiting to snare the unwary
soul."' 3 18 But the very environmental and cultural resources that attract tour-
ists are at risk of impairment. In 1999, the American Rivers organization
listed the Apalachicola River at Apalachicola, Florida as its eleventh most
endangered river in the country. 319 The report blamed river dredging by the
Army Corps of Engineers as the principal factor in the river's decline, de-
scribing it as "a futile effort to maintain a commercial shipping channel that
is barely used., 320 Furthermore, the area may experience unprecedented
growth if the plans of a former paper company and the largest private land-
owner in Florida come to fruition.32 '
Hundreds of miles upstream, Atlanta is culturally a world apart from
Apalachicola. Consistently named one of America's best cities,322 Atlanta is
also one of its fastest-growing cities: the metropolitan population increased
27% between 1970 and 1980, and 33% between 1980 and 1990.323 With this
growth comes an ever-increasing demand for critical resources, including
land and water. In 1998, for example, the Sierra Club listed Atlanta as first
on its list of the thirty "most sprawl-threatened cities. '324 The ranking was
based, in part, upon the observations that the Atlanta metropolitan area de-
veloped 500 acres of open land every week, and that its urban land area
expanded 47% between 1990 and 1996.325 With respect to increasing water
demands, usage is expected to increase by over 40% by 2050.326 The Upper
317. See generally APALACHICOLA BAY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 313.
318. Robert Goad, Rowing Scipio Creek The Old Folk's Primer, FORGOTTEN COAST LINE ONLINE
NEWSPAPER, at http://www.forgottencoastline.comlarchiveshow.asp?articlelD=-1500 (June 10, 2004).
319. Press Release, American Rivers, Most Endangered Rivers of 2002 Announced, (Apr. 4, 2002),
available at http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004/4/prweb36216.htm.
320. Id.
321. See, e.g., PBS, Now With Bill Moyers, The Future of the Florida Panhandle, at http://www.pbs.
org/now/society/panhandle.html (June 5, 2003) (reporting that the St. Joe Company is undertaking an
"unprecedented development project that will forever change an area that experts say is one of the most
environmentally sensitive in the nation").
322. Forbes Magazine picked Atlanta as fourth among its "best cities for singles in 2004." See David
E. Dukerich, Best Cities for Singles, FORBES.COM, at http://www.forbes.com/2004/06/23/04singleand
(June 25, 2004). That same year, Atlanta was rated as the nation's seventh best city in terms of economy,
jobs, cost of living, climate, education, arts, and culture. See Think Your Cio' is Best? See the Latest
Rankings, MSNBC TODAY SHOW, Mar. 30, 2004, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4624179/ (inter-
viewing Bert Sperling and Peter Sander, authors of Cities Ranked & Rated).
323. Satellite Images Show Effects of Urban Sprawl, CNN.CoM, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/NAT
URE/02/21/sprawl.space.01/ (Feb. 21, 2000).
324. Sierra Club, 1998 Sierra Club Sprawl Report: 30 Most Sprawl-Threatened Cities, available at
http://www.sierraclub.orgspmwllreport98/Atlanta.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
325. Id. ("Some experts believe that the region's population could double in the next 50 years. With
no natural barriers, few cities are growing as fast as Atlanta.").
326. GLENNON, supra note 316, at 188 (citing an increase in projected municipal and industrial water
usage from 618 million gallons per day in 1995 to 872 million gallons per day by 2050).
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Chattahoochee River was named among the country's most endangered
rivers in 1998, due primarily to explosive suburban growth in Atlanta.327
The needs of oyster fishers and urban dwellers are not the only demands
placed upon the ACF river basin. Georgia farmers also consume a signifi-
cant amount of water. Despite an average annual rainfall of fifty inches in
southern Georgia, the area's agricultural industry is increasing its reliance
upon artificial irrigation, including the usage of wells tributary to the ACF
Basin surface flows. 328 The farmers have been largely successful in their
efforts to avoid comprehensive state legislation governing the use of
groundwater wells.329
Perhaps not surprisingly, the resources of the Apalachicola, Chattahoo-
chee, and Flint Rivers simply cannot support such a diverse range of life-
styles and needs without conflict. The resultant legal fight has been slow-
moving and procedurally-complex, with a substantive resolution not ex-
pected in the reasonably foreseeable future. In 1990, prompted by Atlanta's
threat to increase its diversion and storage of Chattahoochee River water,
Alabama (later joined by Florida) filed suit against Georgia seeking a judi-
cial apportionment of the ACF Basin waters.330 The litigation was stayed by
court order in September 1990, remaining in effect for almost a decade as
the three states pursued a negotiated settlement of the litigation.3 3' In 1997,
Congress approved the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Interstate Com-
pact negotiated by the three states,33 2 providing simply a procedural frame-
work for additional negotiations.3 33 When the Compact expired on August
31, 2003, 334 no settlement had been reached and the original lawsuit was
reactivated. 3 5 Observers believe that the dispute will reach the U.S. Su-
preme Court for ultimate resolution.
A second sequence of litigation, this time initiated by Georgia, contrib-
uted to the procedural complexity of the matter. During the pendency of tri-
327. ld.; see also American Rivers' 10 Most Endangered Rivers for 1999, PADDLER MAG., July-Aug.
1999, available at http://www.paddlermagazine.comlissues/1999_4/EcoRiver.htm ("Atlanta, the most
sprawling city in the country, is growing so fast it threatens the health of nearby water-sources. The
city's rate of land consumption is eight times greater than its population growth.").
328. For a fascinating account of the non-hydrological factors that have precipitated that transition
from dryland to irrigated agriculture, see GLENNON, supra note 316, at 188-90.
329. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-96(a)(1), 12-5-96(a)(2) (1995) (requiring consumptive use permits
only for surface or groundwater withdrawals exceeding 100,000 gallons per day); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-
5-31(a) (2003) (exempting agricultural uses from the permitting requirement); GLENNON, supra note
316, at 185.
330. See Alabama v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. CV-90-BE- 133 1-E, 2005 WL 457415 (N.D. Ala.
2005). The State of Florida successfully moved to invervene on behalf of the plaintiff, Alabama. Id. at
*1.
331. Id.
332. Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 2219 (1997).
333. See Southeastern Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2004)
(describing the ACF Compact as "an agreement to agree").
334. Id. By that time, the initial deadline had been extended 12 times. Georgia v. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1248 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
335. Preliminary Injunction, Alabama v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 2005 WL 457415, at *1 (enjoining
the Corps and Georgia from executing or implementing storage or withdrawal contracts without the
court's permission).
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state negotiations under the ACF Compact, Georgia took unilateral action to
increase its diversions from the Chattahoochee River upstream of Atlanta,
seeking to use water impounded behind the Buford Dam in Lake Lanier.
To realize this plan, Georgia sued the Army Corps of Engineers, as the op-
erator of Lake Lanier, to compel it to execute Georgia's requested water
supply contract.337 Subsequently, in a related action, a nonprofit consortium
of electric suppliers sued the Army Corps of Engineers to challenge its dis-
tribution of Lake Lanier water.3 38 The lawsuits were resolved through a set-
tlement agreement, but stayed by the federal district court in Alabama pend-
ing resolution of the judicial apportionment action.
B. The Historical Context: Social Integrity
1. Geographical Equity
Water is arguably the most vital of all natural resources, supporting eco-
systems and human systems alike. Accordingly, the engineered movement
of water from one area to another involves, at its core, the redistribution of
wealth, with readily identifiable winners and losers. Given the significance
of the resource, it is no accident that disputes over water have been de-
scribed as water wars.
The western states provide a particularly vivid illustration of the wealth-
transfer implications of water policy. The Colorado River Basin is illustra-
tive of impending water shortages. According to the U.S. Geological Sur-
vey, parts of the Colorado River Basin-serving seven states and rapidly
growing metropolitan regions such as Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and Phoe-
nix-are currently experiencing the worst drought in over four hundred
years. 339 A report issued by the Department of the Interior in 2003 acknowl-
edged the social implications of such water shortages, ominously conclud-
ing, "Today, in some areas of the West, existing water supplies are, or will
be, inadequate to meet the water demands of people, cities, farms, and the
environment even under normal water supply conditions." 340 The report
cited to the Klamath River Basin of the Pacific Northwest and the Middle
Rio Grande River Basin as illustrations of how thinly-stretched water sup-
plies can lead to the eruption of crisis and conflict. 34' Those areas experi-
enced bitter conflicts, demonstrations, and even isolated instances of vio-
336. Georgia v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 302 F.3d at 1247-48.
337. Id. at 1248.
338. See Southeastern Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (approving a settlement agreement allocating Lake Lanier water, but restraining the execution of
the settlement agreement until related litigation in Alabama has been resolved).
339. Patrick O'Driscoll, Western States Kick Off Summer Under Threat of Crippling Drought, USA
TODAY, June 21, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 6659203.
340. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, WATER 2025: PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICr IN THE WEST 2
(May 2,2003), available at http://www.doi.gov/water2025/water.pdf (last visited Jun. 22, 2004).
341. Id. at 10 ("Reality number 3: over-allocated water supplies can cause crisis and conflict").
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lence, as farmers, cities, Native Americans, and environmental advocates
fought desperately to protect their values and ways of life.342
To address impending water crises, many commentators predict an in-
creased reliance on economic principles to facilitate market transfers of
water.343 The inevitable losers under such an approach will be poor, rural,
and agricultural communities. This approach is not necessarily inconsistent
with social integrity, to the extent that it discourages wasteful and ineffi-
cient practices by agriculture and other users. 344 But markets, if not care-
fully devised and regulated, may place an inequitable burden upon the poor
and people of color. A landmark study published in 1987, observed that
water "flows away from the poor."345 In particular, the study documented
how "the Southwest is on a historical trajectory from community to com-




In many instances, water law elevates present over future water users,
allowing present society to enjoy the legal right to exhaust non-renewable
water sources at the expense of future generations. In Colorado, for exam-
ple, the 1965 Ground Water Management Act created four legal categories
of groundwater: designated, tributary, non-tributary, and not non-
tributary.347 Colorado law allows for the use of the latter two categories by
overlying landowners at a rate that will deplete the aquifer within one hun-
dred years. 348 This legal provision may provide an overly-optimistic view of
the aquifer's longevity, however, and the Colorado Geological Survey has
estimated that it may be economically feasible to recover only one-third of
the underground water supply.3 49 In the meantime, some of the nation's
fastest-growing counties-located just south of Denver-have attracted
"[n]ew communities, homeowners, and other landowners ... [who] have
begun to depend heavily on this finite resource. ' 350 In light of unsustainable
342. Id. ("The Nation cannot afford repeated water crises. The social, economic, and environmental
consequences of water supply crises are too severe.").
343. Id. at 14 (listing market-based approaches as a key tool for crisis prevention).
344. Id. ("Most irrigation delivery systems were built in the early 1900s and remain virtually un-
changed today.").
345. James L. Wescoat, Jr. et al., Water, Poverty, Equity, and Justice in Colorado: A Pragmatic
Approach, in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 57, 59
(Kathryn M. Mutz et al. eds., 2002) (reviewing F. LEE BROWN & HELEN INGRAM, WATER AND POVERTY
IN THE SOUTHWEST (1987)).
346. Id. at 60,
347. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137 (West 2003).
348. JUSTICE GREGORY J. HOBBS, JR., COLORADO FOUNDATION FOR WATER EDUCATION, CITIZEN'S
GUIDE TO COLORADO WATER LAW 11 (2004).
349. Id. (describing the 6,7000 square-mile Denver Basin aquifers).
350. Id.
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aquifer pumping by present users, regulators have begun to scramble to find
surface water sources to satisfy users in the not-so-distant future.35" '
Other states have had similar experiences. Decades of virtually unre-
stricted groundwater extraction have taken their toll upon numerous aqui-
fers. The 173,000 square-mile Ogallala High Plains aquifer underlies all or
part of Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Da-
kota, Texas, and Wyoming.352 Beginning in the 1940s, significant rates of
groundwater pumping have caused an average water-level decline of 11.9
feet, representing an average 6% reduction in the volume of water stored in
the aquifer. 35 3 Although these declines may appear to be quite modest, they
represent averages for the entire eight-state region and may mask critical
changes in individual states or areas. In Texas, for example, water levels
have declined an average of 34.5 feet, representing a 27% decrease in the
volume of water stored in the aquifer.354 Many warn that the current rate of
pumping is unsustainable. As one commentator explains,
The Ogallala once held 3 billion acre-feet of water, but High Plains
farmers pumped more than a half-billion acre-feet between 1960
and 1990. As much as half of the remaining water is too deep in the
aquifer to justify the costs of recovery or is of poor quality. As the
water table has plunged, some High Plains farms have already re-
turned to dryland farming, and conservation districts have under-
taken massive water conservation programs.
355
As a result, current farmers may be preventing their children from enjoying
the same benefits of irrigation that they have enjoyed.
351. See, e.g., COLORADO GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SPEC. PUBLICATION 53, GROUND WATER ATLAS
OF COLORADO 87 (2003). In 1985, the Colorado legislature limited groundwater withdrawals from des-
ignated aquifers of the Denver Basin to 1% of "in-place water." Id. About a decade later, deep test wells
drilled into the aquifer "resulted in specific yield values significantly lower than the values assumed in
[the 1985 legislation]. This more recent set of data indicates that the quantity of recoverable water stored
in the basin may be two-thirds what was previously thought." Id.
352. V.L. McGuIRE ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1243, WATER IN STORAGE AND
APPROACHES TO GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT, HIGH PLAINS AQUIFER 29, 32 (2000) (describing
declines from predevelopment to 2000).
353. Id.
354. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Study Documents Water-Level
Changes in High Plains Aquifer (Feb. 9, 2004) (citing water level storage changes over the past fifty
years).
355. GLENNON, supra note 316, at 32. The U.S. Geological Survey observes that "[tlhere are some
areas within the High Plains where water is being withdrawn from the aquifer at rates greater than the
aquifer is being replenished. In these areas, the aquifer will not be able to sustain withdrawals at current
rates in future decades. These declines will have a significant impact on the agricultural economy in the
region." U.S. Geological Survey, supra note 352 (quoting Dr. Robert Hirsch, USGS Associate Director
for Water).
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C. The Historical Context: Separating the Law of
Surface and Groundwater
[Legal classifications such as] "[u]nderflow," "subterranean
streams," and "percolating groundwater," bear little, if any, rela-
tionship to geological realities.... From a hydrogeological perspec-
tive, . . . efforts to fit water into the law's categories by using these




The relationship of scientific principles to water policy poses two op-
posing challenges for integrity. At times, lawmakers pay too little attention
to science. This may be an innocent mistake, involving an erroneous appli-
cation of scientific principles or data.35 7 A few cases may be more insidious.
For example, the current rallying cry that controversial environmental deci-
sions must be consonant with "sound science" invites abuse. Undoubtedly,
"sound" is in the eye of the beholder, and may reflect policy preferences as
much as immutable laws of nature.
The opposite problem occurs when lawmakers rely overmuch upon sci-
ence to determine legal policy. 358 In some cases, this excessive faith in sci-
ence may stem from a failure to appreciate its limits and the uncertainty
inherent in a particular scientific determination. As one commentator de-
scribes the zigs and zags of scientific uncertainty, "A series of scientific
findings and nonscientific assumptions must be linked together to answer a
larger policy question .... [Tlhe gaps in knowledge are not clumped at the
beginning or end of the inquiry, but tend to weave in and out, or zigzag,
with subquestions that science can answer." 359 In other cases, this excessive
reliance upon science may be prompted by a lack of political courage. Leg-
islators may hide behind purportedly unquestionable scientific truths to
avoid the political consequences of a potentially unpopular decision. In this
respect, "[p]ositive scientific knowledge is politically appealing" because
"scientific findings inform the resolution of environmental problems in
seemingly objective and respected ways." 36° In the case of both the naive
356. Joseph L. Sax, We Don't Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U. DEN.
WATER L. REV. 269,272-73 (2003) (emphasis added).
357. A notorious example of this type of mistake is the 1920 allocation of the Colorado River among
the states through which it flowed. Unfortunately, the negotiators divided a more voluminous river than
nature actually supplied. See generally Eric L. Garner & Michelle Ouellette, Future Shock? The Law of
the Colorado River in the Twenty-first Century, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 469, 470 (1995).
358. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 181 (1999).
359. Id. at 191 (emphasis added) (concluding that "it is difficult to summarize the varied scientific
uncertainties that arise in a policymalking exercise as simply the error around a mean").
360. Id. at 221.
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and the fearful legislator, the resultant water policy is weakened. The cool,
objective, and value-neutral language of science may in fact mask subjec-
tive, value-laden decisions. Thus, debatable policy determinations may hide
behind a thin veneer of scientific authority.
Both problems-relying too little upon science, and disguising value
choices as science-produce a bifurcated, non-integrated conceptual ap-
proach to water law.36 ' The traditional separation of surface and groundwa-
ter serves as an example, demonstrating the very real importance of scien-
tific integrity. Largely unimpeded by legal constraints, groundwater usage
has increased dramatically in the United States.362 By the late nineteenth
century, oil supplanted human power, horsepower, and steam engines as the
energy source for well-drilling.3 63 Beginning during the New Deal, rural
electrification projects permitted the extraction of groundwater by electric
pumps. 364 Other technical advancements, including high-lift turbine pumps,
center-pivot irrigation systems, and gear-driven pump heads made large-
scale agricultural irrigation possible.36  Overall, groundwater provides about
22% of the nation's freshwater needs, and over half of its population's
drinking water requirements. 366 In at least four states-Florida, Kansas,
Nebraska, and Mississippi-groundwater withdrawals exceed those of sur-
face water.367
As a time-honored tradition, water law has long accorded separate
treatment to surface water and groundwater. This dichotomy has been sup-
ported by various rationalizations, each surrounded by an impressive but
misleading scientific aura, and each masking important social policy
choices that in fact have little to do with science.
Initially, this legal separation of surface and groundwater was rational-
ized, at least in part, by the lack of scientific understanding of groundwater
movement, and an inability to define the connection with surface water.
Turning the traditional maxim on its head, this ignorance has in fact been an
excuse for the law. Waiting for science to lead the way, the law of numer-
ous states steadfastly refused to regulate groundwater, even as conflicts be-
came apparent. Judges and legislators were loath to constrain groundwater
usage, which they perceived as an essential aspect of land ownership. In
1850, for example, the Connecticut Supreme Court unapologetically rooted
its laissez-faire approach in scientific ignorance:
Water, whether moving or motionless in the earth, is not, in the eye
of the law, distinct from the earth. The laws of its existence and
361. See generally, LEOPOLD, supra note 212, at 260-61 (noting the paradox of "science the sharp-
ener of [man]'s] sword versus science the searchlight on his universe").
362. GLENNON, supra note 316, at 24-26.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 26.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 31 (citing 1995 data).
367. Id.
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progress, while there, are not uniform, and cannot be known or
regulated. It rises to great heights, and moves collaterally, by influ-
ences beyond our apprehension. These influences are so secret,
changeable and uncontroulable, we cannot subject them to the regu-
lations of law, nor build upon them a system of rules, as has been
done with streams upon the surface. Priority of enjoyment does not,
in like cases, abridge the natural rights of adjoining proprietors. 368
The Connecticut court concluded that existing wells had no legal right to the
maintenance of present pumping levels as against subsequent wells that
tapped into the same groundwater supply, even though the trial court had
determined that the defendant's pumping caused the water level in plain-
tiffs well to fall below usable levels. 69 The court simply stated: "Now,
although this effect is found to result from the defendant's acts, yet it is not
found, how this is the result." 370 This approach is representative of the "Eng-
lish rule" (or "absolute ownership" doctrine), which "allows an overlying
landowner to withdraw an unlimited amount of water, unconstrained (in its
purest form) by injury to another landowner., 37' At least by the beginning
of the twentieth century, this scientific-unknowability rationale for the non-
regulation of groundwater had begun to lose its underlying justification. As
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed, "Even in 1903 ... the awe of
mysterious, unknowable forces beneath the earth was fast becoming an
outmoded basis for [the English] rule of law. 372 Nevertheless, the tradition
of unregulated groundwater usage ran deep, and lawmakers persisted in
asserting the rationale well into the twentieth century. In its modem incarna-
tion, the rationale has been recast as a burden-of-proof rule in the face of
scientific uncertainty, rather than unknowability. As such, plaintiffs bear a
sometimes insurmountable burden of demonstrating the harm they will suf-
fer as a result of unconstrained groundwater pumping by specific wells.
37 3
368. Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 540 (1850); see also Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514, 519
(1863) (declining to regulate groundwater pumping on the basis that "[o]ne can hardly have rights upon
another's land which are imperceptible, of which neither himself or that other can have any knowl-
edge").
369. Roath, 20 Conn. at 539.
370. Id.
371. Dellapenna, supra note 242, § 7.02; see Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217
N.W.2d 339, 344 (Wis. 1974) (describing the basis of the English rule of absolute ownership of percolat-
ing groundwater as "a feeling that the ways of underground water were too mysterious and unpredictable
to allow the establishment of adequate and fair rules for regulation of competing rights to such water").
372. Michels Pipeline Constr., 217 N.W.2d at 345 (overruling Huber v. Merkel, 94 N.W. 354 (Wis.
1903)); see also Sax, supra note 356, at 291. Professor Sax argues that at least by 1913, water experts
"did not believe groundwater was too mysterious in its ways to be subject to legal control." Id. Rather,
Professor Sax cites the legislative history of a California statute in support of the proposition that "the
legislative reluctance [in 1913 California] to institute integrated management was fundamentally based
on legal reservations, not technical or managerial ones." Id.
373. See, e.g., Huber, 94 N.W. at 359 (establishing that there is no cause of action for interference
with groundwater, even where the defendant's uncapped artesian wells flowed continuously and spilled
excess water onto the ground); City of Fond du Lac v. Town of Empire, 77 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Wis.
1956) (citing Huber as controlling precedent in holding invalid a town ordinance requiring new well
owners to prove there would be no adverse impact upon existing wells prior to drilling); Hartford Rayon
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As hydrologists learned more about the interaction of surface water and
groundwater, one might expect that legal regulation of groundwater would
follow, accompanied by a rejection of the free-for-all promoted by the Eng-
lish rule. This occurred to some extent, with the increased prominence of
the reasonable use and correlative rights doctrines. Under the former,
groundwater use was restricted to so-called "reasonable" uses only, often
limited to application on the land immediately overlying the aquifer. This
restriction was relatively minor, however, still tolerating a considerable de-
gree of interference with other water users. Under the latter doctrine of cor-
relative rights, even reasonable groundwater uses were restricted further to
the user's fair share of the underlying aquifer, often determined on the basis
of the amount of acreage owned. Although these two doctrines represent an
increased judicial willingness to subject groundwater to the regulation of
law, they generally fall short of a comprehensive scheme of groundwater
management.
A second quasi-scientific rationalization limiting the regulation of
groundwater purports to establish a geologic typology. Whereas the scien-
tific unknowability theory asked too little of science, the geologic typology
asked too much, purporting to use science to draw precise, legal lines be-
tween surface water and groundwater, where no such lines existed in reality.
Under this approach, state law may acknowledge that surface water is con-
nected to only a limited range of groundwater sources-those that flow in
defined underground channels. All other groundwater, however, is assumed
to have no legally-cognizable impact upon other water users. To implement
this approach, the states have used a bewildering array of scientific-
sounding terminology. The first type of groundwater is called, variously,
"subterranean water, 374 "underflow, 375 "subflow, 376 and "underground
Corp. v. Cromwell Water Co., 10 A.2d 587, 588 (Conn. 1940) (refusing to enjoin the defendant from
sinking a well 95-180 feet from a brook to pump 150,000 gallons per day based upon the mere possibil-
ity of injury to surface users, and refusing to assume an injury "in view of the difficulty and uncertainty
attending an attempt to determine the course and amount of water percolating beneath the surface").
Even when courts have found evidence of injury sufficient to constrain groundwater pumping, litigants
have continued to assert the scientific uncertainty rationale. See, e.g., Colorado's Exceptions to the Third
Report of the Special Master, Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105, 2000 WL 1838225, at *37 (Nov. 24, 2000)
(arguing on behalf of Colorado that the adverse impact of Colorado well-pumping upon flows of the
Arkansas River at the Kansas state line was not generally known or understood until at least 1968, and
that "determining the impact of such pumping on usable Stateline flows after 1968 was extremely diffi-
cult").
374. California law, for example, extends its surface water licensing regime to "subterranean streams
flowing through known and definite channels." CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971).
375. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 597 (1899).
376. Arizona's doctrine of prior appropriation, for example, applies to "waters of all sources, flowing
in streams, canyons, ravines or other natural channels, or in definite underground channels, whether
perennial or intermittent, flood, waste or surplus water, and of lakes, ponds and springs on the surface."
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 45-141(A) (West 2003). The state supreme court approved the trial court's interpre-
tation that the statute applied to "subflow," which the court defined as the "saturated floodplain Holo-
cene alluvium." In re Gila River System, 9 P.3d 1069, 1073 (Ariz. 2000) (Gila River III); see also
WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 422 (1956) (defining terms "underflow"
and "subflow").
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channels," 377 whereas the second type of groundwater is often referred to as
"percolating groundwater. 3 78 The first kind has been subdivided further
into "independent known," "dependent known," and "unknown" subterra-
nean water courses.379 Of all the states, Colorado uses perhaps the most
noteworthy terminology. Logically enough, the state distinguishes between
water that is tributary to surface water supplies and therefore subject to the
appropriation system, and water that is nontributary and allocated according
to a modified English rule of capture. 380 But in an interesting turn of phrase,
the Colorado legislature created a third class of groundwater-not nontribu-
tary-which is defined as groundwater in a specified aquifer, "the with-
drawal of which will . . . deplete the flow of a natural stream ... at an an-
nual rate of greater than one-tenth of one percent of the annual rate of with-
drawal.",381 Groundwater within this third typology is subject to a level of
regulation less rigorous than that applied to surface streams, but more rigor-
ous than that applied to nontributary groundwater.
Several important consequences have followed from the longstanding
failure to recognize the integrity and connectedness of surface and under-
ground water. On perhaps the most superficial level, the simultaneous evo-
lution of two distinct bodies of law-one for surface water and one for
groundwater-has resulted in two confusingly overlapping sets of vocabu-
lary. For example, the English rule of groundwater is essentially a rule of
capture that allows considerable injury to one's neighbor without legal li-
ability, whereas the English rule of surface water (also called the "natural
flow theory") is essentially a rule of nonuse that permits very little interfer-
ence with the natural water supply. Likewise, both surface and groundwater
law recognize a reasonable use doctrine, but the two doctrines are not the
same. Rather, it is the "correlative rights" doctrine of groundwater that most
closely resembles the reasonable use doctrine of surface water. In fact, the
former has been called "reasonable use on its side., 382 Moreover, even in
so-called "prior appropriation states" of the West, long-established senior
surface water users may be curtailed in times of shortage, while certain
neighboring junior wells may be allowed to continue pumping from under-
ground aquifers. Ironically, the very states that have emphatically rejected
riparianism may still follow a modified version of the doctrine with respect
to their groundwater resources.
As a second consequence of the scientifically-rationalized divide be-
tween surface and groundwater, judges have been asked to perform virtually
impossible feats. Arizona, for example, adhered to a bifurcated system well
377. ARtz. REV. STAT. § 45-141(A).
378. See, e.g., Michels Pipeline Constr., 217 N.W.2d at 345.
379. See, e.g., In re Gila River System, 857 P.2d 1236, 1243-44 (Ariz. 1993) (Gila River 11) (discuss-
ing the classification scheme in 2 CLESSON S. KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS §
1161 (2d ed. 1912)).
380. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-101 to -143 (West 2000).
381. §37-90-103(10.7).
382. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 941 (3d ed. 2000).
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into the 1980s, under which surface rights were allocated under the prior
appropriation doctrine, and groundwater rights were awarded to the overly-
ing landowner, limited only by the relatively lenient doctrine of reasonable
use.383 As the legislature provided,
The waters of all sources, flowing in streams, canyons, ravines or
other natural channels, or in definite underground channels, whether
perennial or intermittent, flood, waste or surplus water, and of
lakes, ponds and springs on the surface, belong to the public and are
subject to appropriation and beneficial use as provided in this chap-
ter.
384
In the face of this legislative mandate, an Arizona trial court struggled
mightily throughout a five-day trial to answer an essentially unanswerable
question: "Is ground water included within the phrase 'river system and
source' as it is used in [Arizona statutes], and if so, to what extent is it in-
cluded?" 385 The court came up with an impressively scientific-sounding
response, extending the priority system to underground water if it consti-
tuted subflow and "if the volume of stream depletion would reach 50% or
more of the total volume pumped during ... [a] period of withdrawal...
equivalent to 90 days of continuous pumping." 386 The court was immedi-
ately rebuked for its labors. A group of groundwater users complained that
"the 50 % / 90 day rule is too broad, because it includes wells that pump
underground water not appropriable under [Arizona law]," whereas a com-
peting group of water users contended that "the 50 % / 90 [day] rule is too
narrow, because it fails to include all wells that pump appropriable sub-
flow." 387 The Arizona Supreme Court weighed in with the first group, re-
manding the matter to the trial court to once again "determine the criteria
for separating appropriable subflow from percolating groundwater" in a
manner that would not sweep all tributary groundwater into the appropria-
tion system.3 88 The court acknowledged that its focus upon the concept of
383. As the Arizona Supreme Court explained,
This bifurcated system of water rights was not unique to Arizona. It was typical of western
states until around the turn of the twentieth century. At that time, scientific investigation was
revealing that most underground water is hydraulically connected to surface water. As scien-
tific knowledge progressed, most states revised their water laws to provide for unitary man-
agement of hydraulically connected underground and surface water. Arizona, however, did
not, and continues to adhere to a bifurcated system of water rights, with compelling implica-
tions for general stream adjudications.
Gila River II, 857 P.2d at 1240; see also John D. Leshy & James Belanger, Arizona Law Where Ground
and Surface Water Meet, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 657, 657 (1988).
384. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A) (West 2003).
385. See Gila River I, 857 P.2d at 1239.
386. See Gila River II1, 9 P.3d at 1074, cert. denied sub nom Phelps Dodge Corp. v. United States,
533 U.S. 941 (2001); Gila River H1, 857 P.2d at 1239.
387. Gila River II, 857 P.2d at 1242.
388. Id. at 1248; see also id. at 1245 (criticizing the 50 % / 90 day rule as "broad enough to include
all underground water hydraulically connected to a surface stream").
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subflow found no support in science or hydrology, but nevertheless chose to
adhere to what it described as seventy years of judicial precedent. 389
The seemingly objective, technical language of hydrology may in fact
mask important social policy choices. The failure to legally integrate all
water uses ultimately creates human winners and losers. In many instances,
groundwater users obtain an advantage over surface water users. As the Gila
River saga illustrates, courts and legislatures may use the language of sci-
ence to describe decisions that are purely practical and political in nature.
The Gila River court freely acknowledged its bias against placing overly
onerous restrictions upon groundwater use, even at the expense of surface
water users.39O Similarly, the early courts' professed ignorance of the me-
chanics of groundwater movement allowed new well pumpers to extract
groundwater with impunity, even to the detriment of existing surface water
users who had supposedly secured legal protection for their water rights
against subsequent users. As a result of this judicial reluctance to extend the
rule of law into the murky realm of groundwater-particularly in the con-
text of predicting its relationship with surface water--existing surface water
users were forced to bear the virtually impossible burden of proving a
causal relationship between groundwater pumping and reduced surface wa-
ter supplies in a particular stream or lake.
As a final consequence, the legal separation of surface and groundwater
has important ramifications for environmental policy. As aquifers experi-
ence unsustainable rates of decline, environmental consequences follow.
D. The Opportunity: Sharing the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River System
The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint dispute presents yet a third op-
portunity to advance the integrity of water law, this time on a far-reaching,
interstate scale. At least three considerations are particularly relevant: the
integration of surface and ground water, the maintenance of ecological in-
tegrity, and the protection of social integrity. Depending upon the forum in
which the ACF controversy is resolved,39' these considerations may invite
389. The court stated:
The boundary between surface water and groundwater is not at all clear. Most surface streams
not only flow above the ground but also have "subflow." As the parties correctly point out,
"subflow" is not a scientific, hydrological term. But for almost seventy years, this court has
defined "subflow," for legal purposes, as "those waters which slowly find their way through
the sand and gravel constituting the bed of the stream, or the lands under or immediately ad-
jacent to the stream, and are themselves a part of the surface stream."
Gila River I11, 9 P.3d at 1073. On remand, the lower court narrowed its definition of regulated subflow
to include only the saturated floodplain of the Holocene alluvium. Id. at 1080.
390. Id. at 1073-74 ("Under Arizona's bifurcated system .... the concept of subflow serves to pro-
tect appropriable surface water rights against interference caused by the pumping of groundwater. Be-
cause water is a very precious and limited commodity in Arizona, much turns on how 'subflow' is de-
termined."). The court expressed its desire to refrain from "improperly shift[ing] the burden to the
groundwater user to show that its well is not pumping subflow." Id. at 1074.
391. Robert H. Abrams, Compacts and Other Interstate Allocative Devices: The ACF as a Case in
[Vol. 56:4:10091064
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392 393the attention of the states themselves, the Supreme Court, or Con-
394gress.
First, from the perspective of legal integrity, the usage of groundwater
must figure prominently in any allocation of water resources among the
three states. The ACF Compact violates this initial premise, seeking only
"to establish and modify an allocation formula for apportioning the surface
waters of the ACF Basin among the states of Alabama, Florida and Geor-
gia."'3 9 This limited aspiration is inconsistent with hydrologic reality and
hearkens back to the time when groundwater was deemed a mysterious and
wily resource incapable of legal control. 39 6 As groundwater modeling tech-
niques become increasingly sophisticated, albeit still imperfect, the exemp-
tion of groundwater from the ACF Compact makes sense only in the context
of political expediency. By definition, solving the easier part of the problem
now-leaving the more intractable matter of groundwater allocation for
later-is an approach lacking in both hydrologic and temporal integrity.
From the perspective of social integrity, the fairness and equity of any
interstate apportionment may be suspect if not supported by good-faith in-
trastate efforts to manage consumption of groundwater, as well as surface
supplies. Just as the national accounting scandals have spurred a renewed
societal appreciation for an honestly-balanced budget,397 so also it would
seem disingenuous for a state to seek more water from its neighbors without
also attempting to balance its internal water budget.398 In the context of the
ACF Basin, the acts and omissions of Georgia make it an easy target for
criticism. With respect to omissions, Georgia has steadfastly failed to enact
any legislation to meaningfully regulate the use of groundwater.399 As one
commentator explained,
In 1998, [Georgia] legislation purported to regulate agricultural
wells that produced more than 100,000 gallons per day, but it had
enormous loopholes. The law grandfathered all existing users,
granted permits in perpetuity, and regulated only the pumping rate
Point, in AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, EASTERN WATER RESOURCES: LAW, POLICY, AND TECHNOLOGY 191
(1994) (containing documents from a conference in Hollywood, Florida, sponsored by the Section of
Environment, Energy, and Resources).
392. The states may enter into an interstate compact, subject to ratification by Congress. U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 10.
393. The U.S. Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over lawsuits between two or more states. U.S.
CONST. art. m.
394. Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress can apportion water among the states. See, e.g.,
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994); Truckee and Carson River Apportion-
ment, Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
395. Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 2222, art. VI(G)(12) (1992) (emphasis added).
396. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
398. See Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983) (establishing the state's duty to conserve
future water use as a prerequisite to claiming interstate water).
399. For a fascinating account of the expansion of irrigation in a naturally wet state, see GLENNON,
supra note 316, at 188-90.
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and the maximum number of acres, rather than a specific volume of
water per year. Between 1970 and 1990, groundwater withdrawals
in the ACF basin increased by 240 percent. In 1995, Georgia farm-
ers used 350 [million gallons per day] of ACF basin water, most of
it groundwater. Agricultural water use in Georgia is expected to in-
crease to 569 [million gallons per day] by 2050.400
Georgia has also committed sins of omission with respect to its sister states.
As ACF settlement negotiations lagged and as Atlanta continued to grow,
Georgia attempted to negotiate a side-agreement with an alternative water
supplier-the Army Corps of Engineers. Florida and Alabama claimed that
they had been improperly excluded from such allegedly secret negotiations
that were intimately related to the very water supply the ACF Compact
sought to allocate, and cited Georgia's failure to include them in such talks
as one factor leading to the collapse of the broader ACF negotiations. 40 The
foregoing critique of Georgia is simply illustrative of the kinds of tempta-
tions states face in the search for a secure water supply. Georgia's water-
grabbing strategies are undoubtedly followed in numerous other states; in
the context of the ACF allocation, any reforms demanded of Georgia must
be just as stringently imposed against Alabama and Florida.4 °2
An additional question of social integrity arises from the downstream
perspective of Florida's Apalachicola Bay. There, protection of the extraor-
dinary aquatic ecosystem of Apalachicola will also protect an oystering
village that has sustained its way of life for at least four generations. 40 3 In-
adequate freshwater supplies from the Apalachicola River, as well as other
factors, have contributed to the decline of the oystery. As one observer
wryly noted, "Fewer than 500 fishermen remain [in Apalachicola Bay].
Many oystermen have begun working at a new jail nearby. The new prison
jobs offer steady hours and decent pay, but the town of Apalachicola's way
of life may change forever.,,404 Honoring ecological and social integrity, in
the ACF Basin and beyond, would require a reversal of the traditional wis-
400. Id. at 189. According to Professor Glennon, even after Georgia regulators stopped issuing new
well permits following droughts in 1998 and 1999, "farmers ignored the law and installed hundreds of
new wells and irrigation systems." Id.; see also Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in
the Southeastern States at the Opening of the Twent,-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LTLE ROCK L. REv. 9,
65 (2002) [hereinafter The Law of Water Allocation]; Abrams, supra note 391, at 206 (noting that Geor-
gia law requires surface or ground water withdrawals exceeding 100,000 gallons per day to obtain a
permit, but exempts agricultural use from this requirement).
401. See Stacy Shelton, Georgia, Florida Try to Avoid Court Fight Over Water, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., July 26, 2004, at El, available at 2004 WLNR 6345068 (describing a pending "settlement
agreement signed [in 2003] that will allow metro Atlanta to take enough water out of Lake Lanier for 10
to 20 years' worth of new subdivisions, office complexes and shopping malls").
402. Florida water regulation has also been subject to criticism. See The Law of Water Allocation,
supra note 400, at 61 (asserting that "one empirical study of the Florida permit system found that at least
one water district, in order to avoid conflict, routinely granted irrigators' requests for more water than
they actually needed").
403. See GLENNON, supra note 316, at 186.
404. Id.
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dom that projected urban growth must be supported at any cost and often at
the expense of ecosystems. In response to the Sierra Club's 1998 citation of
Atlanta has the urban area most threatened by sprawl,0 5 for example, an
editorial in the Atlanta Constitution vigorously defended the city's poli-
cies. 40 6 The writer's self-proclaimed stance was "pro-choice with respect to
urban development," concluding that "[p]eople should have the freedom to
live and work where they like., 40 7 As a corollary to this view, city managers
must find sufficient water supply to meet the ever-increasing market de-
mand.
At least in theory, the ACF Compact states have asserted the willing-
ness to expand the scope of values deserving of protection. Article VII of
the Compact sets forth the goal of "equitably apportioning the surface wa-
ters of the ACF Basin among the states while protecting the water quality,
ecology and biodiversity of the ACF, as provided in the Clean Water Act..
. the Endangered Species Act... and other applicable federal laws.' '40 8 Al-
though the states may have agreed to this provision, they do not agree in
practice. Although Georgia was willing to assure "minimum flows" of the
rivers, Florida insisted upon a "natural flow" regime designed to protect the
ecological integrity of oysters and other fishery resources-as well as the
fishing villages--of the Apalachicola Bay.409 However, the advancement of
ecosystem and social integrity does not require a blind acceptance of all
water demands that happen to be cloaked in the noble language of protect-
ing vanishing ecosystems and lifestyle. Skilled advocates no doubt recog-
nize the felicitous alignment of interest between maintaining instream flows
now, and the protection of growth potential for the future. Nevertheless, the
implicit assumption that water should inevitably flow uphill toward money
(and votes) must be rejected as a short term, unsustainable strategy devoid
of integrity.
V. CONCLUSION-ETHICAL INTEGRITY AND BOUNDARIES




405. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
406. Wendell Cox, op-ed, Portland Not Sprawl Free, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 23, 1999, available
at http:/lwww.demographia.com/db-atlcunst.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
407. Wendell Cox, Demographia: Pro-Choice with Respect to Urban Development, at http://www.de
mographia.com/dm-prochoice.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) (emphasis added).
408. Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 2222-23, art. V]I(a) (1997) (citations omitted).
409. See J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for a New
Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47, 51-52 (2003).
410. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (rev. 10th ed. 2002).
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Any legal system of integrity must find its roots in pragmatic reality, as
well as in idealistic possibility. Water law has accommodated one reality
quite successfully: the ever-growing demand for water. But it has ignored
another reality: the finite nature of the earth's water supply. Although the
disconnect between supply and demand has been addressed in the past
through marvelous engineering works that move water to the time and place
of its need, an increasing demand cannot be satisfied indefinitely. Water
supply is a zero-sum game that is played out daily at the watershed, state,
and interstate levels. Every drop acquired by one user is a drop taken away
from another user, either now or in the foreseeable future.
The core challenge for water policy makers may be to draw boundary
lines with integrity. Some lines will be physical, involving the mapping of
aquifers, the identification of stream-aquifer interfaces, or the delineation of
watersheds. Other boundaries will be philosophical, carving out the respec-
tive realms of federal and state law, human and ecosystem demands, present
and future needs, or water allocation and pollution control. In all cases,
boundary lines will reflect the tension between water as a commodity and
water as an asset that somehow belongs to the biological and human com-
munities in which it arises. In many cases, boundary lines should be drawn
generously and broadly, freely providing water to promote the well-being of
states and the nation as a whole. In other cases, boundary lines should be
drawn stingily and narrowly, encircling special spheres to be protected and
sustained as unique enclaves of cultural or biological wealth. In most cases,
the line should be drawn somewhere in between, a task that will no doubt
challenge and frustrate policymakers for generations to come.
This Article has illustrated some of the consequences of hydrologic
boundaries-both physical and philosophical-recognized by water law.
Often, there is a direct relationship between hydrologic integrity and the
size of hydrologic units. That is, integrity may suffer when water policy
gives legal significance to unnecessarily small, compartmentalized units.
Recall groundwater users, who historically avoided regulatory limits by
advocating for separate treatment of surface and ground water sources, or
water polluters who sought to avoid federal regulation by claiming that fed-
eral intervention would infringe upon state allocation authority. 411 Similarly,
most jurisdictions distinguish between present and future users of ground-
water, allowing the former to deplete aquifers at unsustainable rates, to the
detriment of the latter.
412
Conversely, in a few cases worthy of greater attention, integrity can be
promoted by drawing boundaries that encompass physical or philosophical
terrain of relatively modest proportions. Transbasin diversions-such as
those contemplated from North to South Florida-may destroy ecosystem
integrity unless the biological needs of the basins of origin are protected.4 13
411. See supra Part I.C.
412. See supra Part IV.B.2.
413. See supra Part HIB.
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Interstate water allocations-such as the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
dispute-may impair social integrity unless decisionmakers find a way to
protect lifestyles as diverse as urban dwellers and oyster fishers.4t 4 And in
perhaps the boldest example of all, the integrity of aquatic ecosystems-
such as the Everglades-may be destroyed unless courts reject the stagger-
ingly sweeping argument that all of the navigable waters of the United
States are fungible components of the same unitary water body.41 5
These are daunting challenges for those who formulate water policy.
But these issues are not unique to water, and other contexts may provide
useful comparisons. The growing field of environmental ethics, for exam-
ple, may provide some insights. As one commentator has reported,
[One] very interesting and useful investigation looked to see if envi-
ronmental ethics had influenced or motivated key decisionmakers-
legislators and judges-in shaping our laws. In other words, [the
investigation] was looking to see if environmental ethics had en-
tered the legal system from the top down. As [the study] reported,
there was very little sign that it had. In contrast, my inquiry focuses
on how ideas from environmental philosophy may start to inform
thinking about environmental issues from the ground up, among the
public. This is a slow process at best, but one that is important to a
fully informed debate about our future.
416
The commentator suggested that the concept of sustainability might serve as
a "stepping stone" to guide environmental ethics in a new direction, away
from the constraints imposed by traditional utilitarian ethics.417
Moving farther afield from water law, the national debate over free
trade has also explored the tension between economic expansion and the
sustainability of the middle-class workforce in the United States.41 8 Even
more broadly, the very question of how we define ourselves as Americans
raises a tension between traditional assimilative melting-pot images and the
sustainability of a diverse range of cultures and backgrounds.4 1 9 If we draw
the philosophical line around "Americans" too narrowly, we risk emphasiz-
ing our differences and invite discrimination by one group against another.
But if we draw the line too broadly, we lose our diversity and all that makes
our nation unique and special.
Even popular culture has been infused by notions of sustainability and
social integrity. In announcing its commitment to encourage "coffee sus-
414. See supra Part IV.A.
415. See supra Part H.D.
416. Alyson C. Flournoy, Building an Environmental Ethic from the Ground Up, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 53, 67 (2003).
417. Id.
418. See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed: Dark Side of Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at A6.
419. See, e.g., Helen Russon, Diversity Is Here to Stay: How Do We Make It Work for Everyone?,
ORE. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 1994, at 9.
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tainability and environmental conservation," the popular coffee company
Starbucks has used "Commitment to Origins" as its trademark program to
protect the environment and economies of coffee-producing countries.
420
Taken together, these diverse fields of water law, business, international
trade, and environmental philosophy offer a wide range of opportunities to
advance the notions of integrity and sustainability-if only we can draw the
boundary lines correctly. Perhaps we should contemplate these opportuni-
ties while enjoying a cup of sustainably-grown, organic coffee.
420. See Coffee Sourcing in Origin Countries, at http://starbucks.co.uk/en-GB/_Social+Responsibilit
y(Commitment+to+Origins.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2004).
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